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Double Reverse Discrimination in Housing:
Contextualizing the Starrett City Case,
THOMAS W. SIMON*
LAw students learn how to brief cases in terms of facts, issue, deci-
sion, and rationale. Take the following housing discrimination case:
Facts: About 23,000 residents live in an integrated housing complex
called Starrett City, built about twenty years ago on a former landfill on
the outskirts of the East New York section of Brooklyn. Starrett City
maintained integration through racial quotas which limited the percent-
age of black and hispanic applicants accepted as tenants.
Issue: Whether Starrett City's policy of integration maintenance through
quotas violated Section 3604 (a) of the Fair Housing Act ("the Act"),
which makes it unlawful "to refuse to rent or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, or national
origin." 2
Decision: Starrett City acted contrary to the Act and therefore must
abandon its integration maintenance policy.
Rationale: The Act embodies an anti-discrimination' principle, which
Starrett City's use of racial quotas violated.
While law students quickly abandon the tiresome task of briefing
each and every case, the mode of analysis lingers on, providing the basic
building stones of most legal analyses. Whatever the merits of the
method, it has some devastating consequences for understanding at-
tempts to counter discrimination. The method's crisp and clear catego-
* Professor, Department of History and Philosophy, University of Baltimore. The author
would like to thank Professors Thomas Mengler and Laurie Reynolds for their insightful critiques,
and research assistants Elizabeth Caliendo, Christine Keithley, and Katherine Scheeler for their
thorough investigations.
1. The source of the phrase "double reverse discrimination" is Jefferson Morley's article, Double
Reverse Discrimination: Starrett City Achieves Integration Through Preferential Treatment for
Whites, NEW REPUBLIC, July 9, 1984, at 14 [hereinafter Double Reverse Discrimination]. The
double reverse takes effect by first discriminating in favor of minorities (by allowing them in the
housing project) and then disfavoring them (by placing a ceiling on their numbers). Id.
2. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-19, 901, 82 Stat. 73, 81-90 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988 & Supp. I 1989 )). The Fair Housing Act is also known as "Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968." Throughout the text it will be referred to as "Title VIII,"
"Fair Housing Act," or "the Act."
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ries decontextualizes by removing the case from its historical, political,
economic, and sociological context.
While discrimination, especially in its common everyday manifesta-
tions, remains difficult to fully comprehend, efforts to counter discrimi-
nation prove even more inscrutable. Numerous writers have tried to
reveal the context of discrimination,3 in all its sordid detail. Far fewer
have shed light on the contradictory aspects of policies such as affirma-
tive action, designed to retard the growth of discrimination.4 Housing
developers resort to a number of devices to counter racial discrimination,
including strategic site selection, affirmative tenant assignment, and inte-
gration maintenance.' This Article focuses on an example of an integra-
tion maintenance plan-the racial quota employed by Starrett City.
The United States v. Starrett City Associates6 the so-called "para-
digm Fair Housing Act case" 7 involved the Federal Government's suc-
cessful challenge to the housing project's policy of placing a ceiling on
the number of minority residents. Paradoxically, although many find
that policy repugnant, Starrett City stands virtually alone as one of the
most successful examples of integrated federally subsidized housing
projects in the country.8 Few other projects can boast of the stability and
longevity that Starrett City maintained. How can a policy that discrimi-
nates counteract discrimination?
Almost no legal commentator has come to the defense of Starrett
City's integration maintenance policy;9 most scholars agree with the
courts and reject the policy as discriminatory.10 However, this consensus
3. For a recent compilation on the forms of racism, see generally ANATOMY OF RACISM (D.
Goldberg ed. 1990).
4. Cf. J. LuKAs, COMMON GROUND (1985) (a detailed description of the affect of busing in
Boston on ordinary people from different backgrounds).
5. See The Benign Housing Quota: A Legitimate Weapon to Fight White Flight and Resulting
Segregated Communities, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 891, 895-96 (1974).
6. 640 F.Supp. 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), affrd 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
946 (1988).
7. Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas: Fair Housing or Forced Housing?, 55
BROOKLYN L. REv. 197, 227 (1989) [hereinafter Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance
Quotas].
8. See Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 106 (J. Newman, dissenting).
9. I have found only one defense of Starrett City's integration maintenance plan in the legal
literature. See Note, Racial Integration in Urban Public Housing: The Method is Legal, The Time
Has Come, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 349, 374 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Racial Integration in Urban
Public Housing].
10. See Schwemm, Fair Housing Act: When Good Intentions Aren't Enough, Legal Times, May
16, 1988, at 19, col. 1. According to Schwemm, "[m]ost outside observers seem to believe that the
Starrett City quotas do violate the Fair Housing Act." Id.
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of condemnation has formed too rapidly; as more factors enter the analy-
sis of the merits of Starrett City's policy, the practice becomes easier to
defend.
Attacks on Starrett City's policy, from legal commentators and the
courts, fail to take into consideration the contextual conditions under
which Starrett City had to operate. This Article proceeds through three
stages in order to make the context more apparent. Part I provides a
typical exposition of the case, with little background information. Part
II opens the floodgate of contextual detail, which proves useful when
assessing the case, primarily in Starrett City's favor, in Part III.
However, the Article continues the analysis; rather than rejoicing in
a Starrett City victory, the Article ends on a cautionary note. Until soci-
ety fully embraces a principle, such as anti-subjugation, which directly
confronts the foundations of racism, it must remain satisfied with the
incomplete, half-hearted, contradictory efforts of policies such as Starrett
City's." Refusing to engage in an all out war on racism condemns soci-
ety to a state of in-betweenness, where efforts to combat racism, by their
very nature, become quixotic.
I. DocTRINAL ANALYSIS
A. Nature of Doctrinal Analysis
Legal analysis in Starrett City's policy fits into a genre of reasoning
called doctrinal analysis, essentially a more sophisticated version of a law
student's case brief. A doctrinal approach analyzes a case in terms of
statutory language and legislative intent. In lieu of clear language or in-
ferable legislative intent, and in light of a subset of facts eligible for con-
sideration, the parties and the courts in this case relied on the principles
of anti-discrimination, color-blindness, and pro-integration to find ways
of resolving the Starrett City dispute.
The following sections contain straightforward doctrinal analysis
which dominates legal thinking today. 2 The factual intricacies and his-
11. Cf Goel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority Interests" An Anti-Subjugation Theory
for Equality in Housing, 22 URn. LAW. 369 (1990) (employs the same principles but comes to very
different conclusions in opposing integration maintenance programs). In an earlier article, Goel
takes a similar approach to Starrett City, but once again draws different conclusions from those of
this Article. See Recent Developments, Restricting Minority Occupancy to Maintain Housing Inte-
gration - United States v. Starrett City Associates 840 F2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied 109 S.Ct
376 (1988), 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 561 (1989) [hereinafter Recent Developments].
12. Although doctrinal analysis dominates current legal thinking, it has not gone unchallenged.
Individuals within the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") movement have launched a concerted attack
on doctrinal analysis. For a summary of the CLS critique see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE To CRIrICAL
1991]
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torical background of the case do not have a great deal of value for a
doctrinal analysis. In Starrett City, one can readily see the misleading
nature of a doctrinal approach, by comparing it to an analysis that more
fully fleshes out the factual and historical components.' 3
B. Doctrinal Facts
The following section describes the small subset of facts upon which
the doctrinal analysis rests. Starrett City, the largest integrated housing
project in the country, is located on 153 acres, formerly the site of a
garbage dump, along Jamaica Bay in southeastern Brooklyn between
Canarsie and East New York. 4 Starrett City contains 46 high-rise build-
ings with 5,881 one to three bedroom units, housing approximately
17,000 residents of 39 different nationalities.I s
In 1971 the United Housing Foundation abandoned its attempt to
develop cooperative apartments, despite a loan from the New York State
Housing Finance Agency ("HFA").'6 The Starrett City Housing Corpo-
ration later agreed to take over the development as rental housing rather
than as cooperative housing. 7 From the beginning, Starrett City has
maintained integration through occupancy controls which limit the
number of black and hispanic tenants to about 40 percent.18 As a result
of this policy, blacks wait an average of 20 months for a two bedroom
apartment whereas whites only have a two month waiting period.' 9
The Attorney General of the United States commenced the suit
against the owners and developers of Starrett City on grounds that they
LEGAL STUDIES (1987). Munger and Seron turn the table on CLS by accusing CLS of engaging in
doctrinal analysis. See Munger & Seron, Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal Theory: A Com-
ment on Method, 6 LAW & POL'Y 257 (1984). They characterize doctrinal analysis as assuming
"that neither the political origins of rules nor the way in which decisions may ultimately redistribute
benefits or burdens has relevance in a legal decision... [and] processes that produce rules and poli-
cies in cases are treated as if they do not matter .... Id. at 260.
13. At best, this critique of the Starrett City case provides inductive proof of the failure of a
doctrinal analysis. The Article does not lodge a wholesale critique of doctrinal analysis.
14. Brief for Defendants-Appellant at 6, Starrett City (citing Rosenberg Affidavit ("Aff")).
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
at 2-3, Starrett City.
16. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. at 670.
17. Id
18. See id. at 671.
19. The District Court noted that "in February 1979, blacks constituted over 47% of the wait-
ing list but occupied fewer than 21% of the Starrett City apartments in June 1979, whereas whites
constituting less than 24% of those on the waiting list occupied more than 63% of the apartments.
As of October 1985, blacks made up 53.7% of the waiting list but, as of January 1984, occupied only
20.8% of Starrett City apartments." Idt at 672. Differential waiting periods proved crucial in the
case.
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had violated the Fair Housing Act.2" The government charged Starrett
City with violating Section 804, parts (a), (b), (c), and (d) of the Act.21
The issue was whether the racial quotas used in renting apartments vio-
late provisions of the Fair Housing Act. 2 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment
and enjoined Starrett City from using racial quotas.23 A divided panel of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's deci-
sion.24 The Supreme Court denied Starrett City's petition for certiorari,
with Justice White voting to hear the case.2"
C. Positions
As was previously noted, there were three conflicting principles at
work in this case: anti-discrimination, color-blindness, and pro-integra-
tion. Starrett City defended its policy in terms of the intrinsic worth of
integration. The government attacked Starrett City's policy as a blatant
violation of the ideal that housing policy should be color-blind. Unable
to take refuge in the statutory language or legislative intent, the courts
had to choose a principle to provide the foundation for its decision. In-
stead of opting for one of the principles proposed by the parties, the Dis-
trict Court and the Second Circuit relied on the principle of anti-
discrimination. On the one hand, the courts rejected Starrett City's pol-
icy on the ground that it failed to live up to the demands of anti-discrimi-
nation, according to which innocent victims should not be mistreated
because of their race. On the other hand, since they accepted some race-
20. Id at 669.
21. See id at 670. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1991) provides in part that:
[lit shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate
for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish... any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect
to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin....
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling is in fact so available.
22. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 640 F. Supp. at 671.
23. Id at 679.
24. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988).
25. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 488 U.S. 496 (1988).
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conscious measures, they could not fully adopt the government's color-
blindness principle. While the parties and the courts in this case readily
invoked principles, they uniformly failed to offer satisfactory justifica-
tions for the principles.
1. Starrett City's Pro-Integration Argument. The Starrett City de-
velopers argued that the use of ceiling quotas serves as a means for imple-
menting the integration goal of the Fair Housing Act.26 As a sponsor of
the Act, Senator Mondale acknowledged its integration policy:
I know of no single action we could take which would contribute more to
understanding, to peace and justice within our country, and to the moral
decency of all Americans than the simple matter of Congress declaring that
we have had the last segregation in the sale and rental of living quarters in
the United States, and that once and for all we have decided, as a nation, to
live together, not separately.'
Based in part on Mondale's remarks, Starrett City argued that section
3608 of the Act imposed an affirmative duty to promote integrated resi-
dential patterns.2"
Starrett City also relied on Otero v. New York Housing Authority2 9.
In Otero, the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") relocated
mostly "non-white" families in order to clear a site for two buildings. 30
Many of these minority relocated families applied for housing in the
newly constructed buildings. NYCHA departed from its own regulation
granting priority to former occupants and gave priority to a certain
number of white families in order "to prevent racial imbalance in the
project and in the surrounding community."31 The Otero Court found
NYCHA "obligated to take affirmative steps to promote racial integra-
tion even though this may in some instances not operate to the immedi-
ate advantage of some non-white persons."132 The court recognized that
26. See Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1100.
27. Brief for Defendants-Appellant at 34, Starrett City (quoting statement of Sen. Mondale in
114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968)).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d). It states in part that
[all executive departments and agencies shall administer their programs and activities
relating to housing and urban development (including any Federal agency having regula-
tory or supervisory authority over financial institutions) in a manner affirmatively to
further the purposes of this subchapter and shall cooperate with the Secretary to further
such purposes.
Id.
29. Otero v. New York Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 1124.
31. Id. at 1128.
32. Id. at 1125. Notice that the Second Circuit in Otero allowed for the disadvantaging of some
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a public housing authority such as NYCHA has a federal constitutional
and statutory duty to promote integration.33 In light of Otero, Starrett
City argued that it had an affirmative duty to promote integration.34 Ac-
cording to Starrett City, the principle of integration should prevail in this
case.
2. Government's Color-Blindness Position. The Government did
not deny that Congress, in passing the Act, had some hope that the legis-
lation would stimulate more integrated living patterns. The Government
maintained that the Act's goal was nondiscrimination, not integration.35
According to this view, instead of forcing integration in housing, Con-
gress opted for the far less draconian measure of "a complete ban on the
use of racial criteria in housing matters. ' 36 The Government also found
support for its color-blindness position in remarks of the bill's sponsor,
Senator Walter Mondale: "[w]hat this bill does is to make race irrele-
vant, which is the foundation of this country. ' 37 Relying on the color-
blind approach found in the Fair Housing Act's legislative history, the
Government attempted to discredit Starrett City's explicit use of race in
its occupancy control mechanism.
Moreover, the Government urged the District Court to narrowly
interpret Otero. Unlike the NYCHA, the state actor in Otero, the devel-
opers of Starrett City,
operate a continuing program of racial discrimination of indefinite dura-
tion; they do not employ race-conscious selection to avoid creation of a
"pocket ghetto" that would adversely affect a surrounding integrated com-
munity; and they take race into account in the selection, rather than the
mere assignment of tenants to a particular location and offer rejected ten-
ants no alternative housing.38
minority applicants. The same court refused to allow the minority to be disadvantaged in Starrett
City. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1106.
33. Otero, 484 F.2d at 1133-34.
34. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1101.
35. The Government contended that "[r]acial discrimination was the evil Congress intended to
eliminate when it enacted Title VIII. Congress expected increases in integrated living patterns only
as a desirable and eventual by-product of the absolute ban of discrimination against blacks, whites,
and all other persons." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 25, Starrett City.
36. Id. at 18.
37. Id. at 23 (quoting statement of Senator Mondale in 114 CONG. REC. 5643 (1968)).
38. Id. at 47. If the Government was seriously concerned that rejected tenants had no alterna-
tive, then why did it attempt to upset the consent decree in the earlier case, wherein new opportuni-
ties were opened up for rejected tenants at Starrett City and other housing projects? See infra note
121 and accompanying text. Ackerman finds providing a housing alternative crucial in order to
overcome the constitutional problem of denying a person's rights through ceiling quotas. See Acker-
1991]
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In Otero, the agency allowed a preference only initially, in filling up
newly constructed housing; Starrett City's preferences were ongoing.
Therefore, even if Otero was still good law, which the Government
doubted, its tentative and temporary integration scheme distinguished it
from Starrett City's.
3. The District Court and "Tipping." With relatively little analy-
sis, the District Court concluded that Starrett City's differential treat-
ment of minorities violated the Act;39 the court simply referred to the
anti-discrimination purpose of the Act.40 It distinguished Otero from
Starrett City on grounds that unlike the New York Housing Authority in
Otero, Starrett City as a private landlord, could not clothe itself with
governmental authority.41 Finally, the court rejected the "tipping" phe-
nomenon as a basis for Starrett City's policy since social scientists could
not agree on even a reasonable range for when tipping would occur.42
Tipping is "a threshold after which there is an acceleration in the rate of
white out-movement from a neighborhood"43 or housing area. Some
consider tipping a euphemism for white flight caused by an influx of
blacks.'
4. The Court of Appeals and Anti-Discrimination. The Second Cir-
cuit refused to adjudicate the dispute between Starrett City and the gov-
ernment in terms of who had the correct interpretation of the legislative
history of the Act.45 It noted the ambiguity in the sparse legislative his-
tory surrounding the adoption of the FHA. 6 Although "quotas pro-
moted Title VIII's integration policy," they also contravened its
man, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Controls, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245,
294 (1974).
39. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. at 679.
40. Id. at 677.
41. Id. at 678.
42. Id at 678.
43. Goering, Neighborhood Tipping and Racial Transition:. A Review of Social Science Evidence,
44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 69-78 (Jan. 1978).
44. Tipping "is essentially a racism index." See Current Issues, United States v. Starrett City
Associates and the United States v. Yonkers Board of Education: Can More be Done to Remedy
Housing Discrimination?, 4 J. OF LEGAL COMMENTARY 1, 30 (1988) [hereinafter Current Issues].
45. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1101.
46. The legislative history on the Fair Housing Act is sparse because the legislation passed with
only floor debates and no committee hearings. See Comment, Justifying A Discriminatory Effect
Under the Fair Housing Act: A Search For the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REv. 398, 426-27
n.136 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, Justifying A Discriminatory Effect].
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commitment to color-blindness. a7 Finding no guidance in the legislative
history, the Second Circuit turned to analogous provisions in federal law,
namely, race-conscious affirmative action principles contained in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, which bar discrimination in the employment
context.4" Because the Supreme Court previously recognized race-con-
scious affirmative action plans as not violative of federal constitutional or
statutory provisions,49 the Second Circuit rejected the government's
color-blind position opposing all uses of race.5"
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found that Starrett City's use of
ceiling quotas lacked any of the characteristics of federally sanctioned
race-conscious remedies.51 Unlike constitutionally permissible forms of
affirmative action, Starrett City's scheme was not temporary; it was not
designed to remedy prior discrimination by Starrett City; and it was a
ceiling and not a floor or access quota. Finally, in emphasizing the lim-
ited, one-time scheme approved of in Otero, the court rejected Starrett
City's reliance on that case.52
Thus, the Second Circuit explicitly adopted an anti-discrimination
policy, which permitted race-conscious remedies only under very limited
conditions. However laudable the goal of integration, the court rejected
it when the goal placed a burden on the very people it was supposed to
benefit.
5. The Dissent and Integration. Judge Jon 0. Newman, in dissent,
argued that the purpose behind the Act was to end segregated housing,
not to ban integrated housing.53 In Newman's view, Starrett City did not
act contrary to the purpose of the statute because rather than promoting
segregated housing, it maintained integrated housing. 4 The Act, accord-
ing to Newman, was never intended as a weapon to undo "one of the
most successful examples in the nation of racial integration in
47. The Second Circuit discussed the Act's underlying "color-blindness" policy in terms of an
"antidiscrimination" policy. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1101.
48. Id. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
The Supreme Court has accepted access quotas to remedy employment discrimination. See
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding a one-black-for-each-white promotion
scheme).
49. See, eg., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding a voluntary affirma-
tive action plan against the claim that it violated Title VII).
50. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d. at 1101.
51. Id. at 1102.
52. Id. at 1103.
53. Id. at 1105 (Newman, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1106.
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housing."55
Judge Newman also questioned the majority's differentiation be-
tween the scheme approved of in Otero and Starrett City's policy because
he believed that nothing in the Act supported the majority's use of policy
duration as definitive.56 Accordingly, even if the duration of Starrett
City's policy were determinative, Starrett City was still entitled to a
trial.57 Judge Newman acknowledged the controversial nature of a pol-
icy that denied minorities an equal opportunity to access rental housing.
However, he also found "a substantial argument against forcing an inte-
grated housing complex to become segregated."5 8
D. Critique
A doctrinal analysis proves unsatisfactory in this case on its own
terms. Neither statutory language nor legislative history provide a clear-
cut adjudication of the case; the statutory language of the Fair Housing
Act and the legislative intent provide no compelling answer as to the
validity of integration maintenance.
Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act prohibits discriminatory
refusals to sell, to rent, and to negotiate for housing. 9 Starrett City did
not engage in the prohibited conduct of refusing to rent or negotiate with
minorities. However, another substantive provision, section 3604(a)
makes it unlawful to "otherwise make unavailable or deny" a dwelling on
discriminatory grounds.' Courts have held that the catch-all provision
prohibits practices such as steering which involves channeling minority
housing prospects to designated areas and discouraging them from inves-
tigating other areas.61 While practices that foster racial segregation
clearly fall under the general provision, practices that foster integration
do not fit neatly within the ban.
Moreover, proponents of integration maintenance can point to their
own supportive statutory language. Section 3608(d) provides that "[tihe
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall... administer the
55. Id. at 1103.
56. Id. at 1107.
57. Id
58. Id at 1108.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988).
60. Id.
61. See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd without opinions, 547 F. 2d
1168 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Youritan Construction Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal.
1973), affid as modified, 509 F. 2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975).
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programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a
manner affirmatively to further the policies of this subchapter."62 Propo-
nents interpret this clause as mandating the promotion of integration.63
At best, the statutory language provides ambivalent guidance and does
not definitively proscribe Starrett City's integration maintenance plan.
Similar to the statutory language, the legislative history of Title VIII
does not settle the question of the validity of integration maintenance
programs. No one seems to deny the anti-discriminatory intent behind
the Act. However, integration maintenance proponents can also muster
ample evidence that Congress also intended to promote integration
through the Act. Courts frequently cite the integration goal of the Act."
Choosing among these principles may become easier in light of contex-
tual factors beyond the confines of statutory language and legislative
intent.
Not able to find a foundation in either the statutory language or
legislative intent, both the District Court and the Second Circuit turned
to a guiding principle upon which to base its decisions. However, the
choice of this principle should be viewed within the contextual reality.
Moreover, when an agent purports to take an action in order to help
eradicate a recognized evil such as racism, the courts should have further
incentive to more closely examine the context of the case. For only then
can the courts fully assess the agent's allegedly benevolent actions. This
Article in Part II turns to a detailed description of contextual factors
(historical, economic, political, and sociological) surrounding the case.
II. BACKGROUND AS FOREGROUND
A contextual analysis, which uncovers the historical, sociological,
economic, political forces at work in the case, provides a tool for choos-
ing between the competing principles. As more social factors become
apparent, the integration principle gains plausibility over its color-blind-
ness and anti-discrimination rivals. In its traditional form, legal analysis
takes a case through a series of distillations. As soon as a controversy
62. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (1988).
63. Otero v. New York Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir 1973).
64. See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F. 2d
1283, 1289-1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Otero v. New York City Hous-
ing Authority, 484 F. 2d 1122, 1133-1135 (2d Cir. 1973); Shannon v. United States Dep't of Hous.
and Urban Dev., 436 F. 2d 809, 820-821 (3d Cir. 1970); Williamsburg Fair Housing v. New York
City Housing Authority, 450 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Linmark Associates v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977) (construing the goal of a local ordinance as pro-
moting stable integrated housing).
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enters the legal arena, the distillation process begins because only a cer-
tain subset of factors have any legal relevance. Otherwise, the legal sys-
tem would find itself even more burdened with factual determination
than it does presently. Some factors prove irrelevant to the issue at hand;
other factors seem too difficult to assess. As the case proceeds from the
trial stage to the various appellate levels, the context within which the
case had been embedded quickly erodes. Although the distillation pro-
cess has its own rationale, in the case of Starrett City dimming the lights
on the background has a distorting effect. The following should help to
illuminate the background, leading to a greater appreciation of Starrett
City's policy. By ignoring or glossing over these factors, the courts' doc-
trinal analyses and rulings oversimplify and hinder a just result.
A. Housing Background
1. Housing Policy. Starrett City must be evaluated in the context
of a federal housing policy which condoned racism. Acknowledging the
government sanctioned connection takes some of the sting out of Starrett
City's policy because its policy did not arise out of a vacuum; it arose in
response to this context.
Housing discrimination has a long and persistent history. Discrimi-
natory zoning practices restricted minorities to less affluent neighbor-
hoods until the Supreme Court declared this practice unconstitutional in
1917.65 Whites then resorted to racially restrictive covenants under
which owners and developers agreed not to sell or rent housing to minor-
ities. Likewise the Supreme Court found state court enforcement of these
restrictive covenants unconstitutional in 1948.66
However, housing discrimination continued under the auspices of
the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"), 67 which required racial
restrictions in its home ownership insurance programs. 68 Thus, the fed-
65. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (zoning ordinance that forbids minorities to
occupy houses in blocks predominated by whites violates the fourteenth amendment).
66. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
67. The Federal Housing Administration, established by the Housing Act of 1934, was created
to insure residential mortgagees on private dwellings against the individual buyer's failure to repay.
See HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, UNDER-
WRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING ANALYSIS UNDER TITLE II, SECTION 203 OF THE NA-
TIONAL HOUSING ACT § 1, 101-102 (1936).
68. The FHA guidelines for mortgage appraisal called for protection of neighborhoods from the
"infiltration of... inharmonious racial groups." Id. at § 2, 9229. The FHA finally removed this
explicitly racist language in the 1950s. see HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE, FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION, UNDERWRITING ANALYSIS UNDER TITLE II, SECTION 203 OF THE NATIONAL
HOUSING AT § 13, 1320 (1955). See generally K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CIT-
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eral government played a crucial role in creating a dual housing market.
The discriminatory policies of the FHA had an enormous impact in as-
sisting white flight from the inner cities to the suburbs because the FHA
financed three out of every five homes purchased.69 By creating segre-
gated housing patterns, the government was pivotal in establishing the
historical grounding for white flight. Low income, publicly funded hous-
ing programs began in the late 1930s.70 These programs also played an
integral role in confining blacks to inner cities. For example, as of 1962,
almost eighty percent of all federally subsidized public housing projects
were occupied by only one race.71 Today, government subsidized hous-
ing projects face considerable opposition. Many hold fast to the belief
that government subsidized housing leads to segregated slums.72 Robert
Rosenberg, manager of Starrett City, claims that this perception helped
to defeat several New York State housing bond propositions.73 Because
of these factors, Starrett City's establishment of a stable integrated hous-
ing unit faces an uphill battle.
2. Fair Housing Act. The Fair Housing Act of 196874 plays an
vital role in Starrett City. President Johnson proposed the law in 1966,
but after passage in the Senate, the Act became bogged down in the
House Rules Committee and failed to pass. 75 Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. was assassinated on April 4, 1968.76 By April 11th, hardly a week
later, the law passed Congress, (with no committee report and only a
floor debate), and President Johnson signed it into law.77 Dr. King's as-
sassination resulted in urban unrest and rioting.7" The Fair Housing Act
evolved from a political compromise which attached to the substantive
IES: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1965); Lief & Goering, The Im-
plementation of the Federal Mandate for Fair Housing, 32 URn. AFF. ANN. REvs. 227 (1987).
69. See Lief & Goering, supra note 68, at 229.
70. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 412, amended by the Housing Act of 1949,
Pub. L. No. 171, 63 Stat. 413.
71. See Lief& Goering, supra note 68, at 231. See generally G. GRIER & E. GRIER, EQUALITY
AND BEYOND: HOUSING SEGREGATION AND THE GoALs OF THE GREAT SoCIETY (1966) (the
authors examine the problem and consequences of segregation in residential areas).
72. Notice that the belief that federally subsidized housing leads to segregated slums is, in part,
an empirical claim that may or may not have racist implications.
73. Rosenberg, Starrett City's Sound Racial Policy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1988, at A27, col. 1.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
75. See Comment, Justifying A Discriminatory Effect, supra note 46 at 426-27 n.136.
76. L. DAVIS, I HAVE A DREAM... THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 247
(1969).
77. Comment, Justifying A Discriminatory Effect, supra note 46, at 426-27 n.136.
78. Id.
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provisions legislation enabling the federal government to prosecute those
involved in riots and civil disorders.79 While political compromise is lit-
tie cause for surprise, the ambivalent beginnings of the Act exemplifies
the futility of determining a clear-cut legislative intent or guiding princi-
ple. Thus, when deciding which principle upon which to determine the
case, courts should look beyond the legislation.
a. Discriminatory Intent. Congress enacted the Act under its
powers to abolish slavery and involuntary servitude, granted to Congress
by the thirteenth amendment.8 0 Unlike a constitutional equal protection
claim, plaintiffs under the Act need only show a discriminatory effect and
not a discriminatory intent.81 Once plaintiff shows discriminatory effect,
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove a legitimate state interest can-
not feasibly be met in a less discriminatory manner.82 The Supreme
Court refused to address the government's attempt to require a showing
of discriminatory intent in National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People v. Town of Huntington,83 by prohibiting Huntington,
Long Island from using local zoning to concentrate low-income housing
in a minority neighborhood. For the time being at least, a showing of
discriminatory effect appears sufficient to establish a cause of action.
Certainly, Starrett City intentionally discriminated in the sense that
it explicitly excluded some individuals because of their race. However,
no one accused Starrett City's developers of malicious discriminatory in-
tent. In fact, the developers appear adamant about maintaining decent
integrated housing. Robert Rosenberg, the general manager of Starrett
City since its construction began, served as first deputy housing commis-
sioner of New York City under Mayor John Lindsay.84 In that capacity
he "had broken all records for producing subsidized and city-assisted
79. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 513 (2d ed. 1980). Immediately fol-
lowing passage of the Act, President Johnson requested $11.1 million to administer the Act. Id. at
513, n.9 (citing N.Y. Times, May 25, 1968, at 17, c.1). Congress refused to appropriate the funds.
Id.
80. The thirteenth amendment provides that: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary ser-
vitude ... shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XlI. The enactment of the Fair Housing Act was therefore a valid exercise of Congress' power to
eradicate slavery and involuntary servitude. See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-49 (1968).
81. See, e.g., Town of Huntington v. NAACP, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 1023
(1989).
82. See id. at 936.
83. 844 F:2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 1023 (1989).
84. Hellman, A Dilemma Grows in Brooklyn: Starrett City Fights to Keep Its Racial Mix, NEw
YORK, Oct. 17, 1988, at 55.
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housing-more than 25,000 units, by his count.""5  Opponents of inte-
gration maintenance cannot point to Starrett City's developers as the
paradigmatic "bad guys."
b. Enforcement. 6 The Fair Housing Act provides for three meth-
ods of enforcement: (1) suits by the Attorney General of the United
States under section 813 of the Act;87 (2) administrative complaints to
the Department of Housing and Urban Development provided for under
section 810;88 and (3) direct court action brought by private complain-
ants pursuant to section 810." Currently, the Justice Department files
very few complaints under section 813.' ° The Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") files around 5,000 complaints yearly,
but HUD cannot issue cease and desist orders, thereby making it impo-
tent in the face of a recalcitrant defendant.9 ' Most major decisions re-
garding the Act have come about through so-called "private attorney
generals."92 In other words, enforcement of the Act largely depends
upon private citizens bringing suit. However, the difficulty in finding vic-
tims willing to litigate, proffer statistical evidence, and recover de mini-
mus awards93 creates obstacles not as prevalent in other, more heavily
litigated civil rights fields, such as employment discrimination. 94 Thus,
the Act does not provide readily available means of enforcement against
housing discrimination.
85. Id.
86. Since Starrett City, Congress enacted, on September 13, 1988, amendments to the Fair
Housing Act designed to put more teeth into the Act. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619. None of these changes affects the analysis offered in the Article.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1988).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1988).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1988).
90. For example, in 1987 the Attorney General filed only 17 suits, the most for any year under
the Reagan administration. Schwemm, The Limits of Litigation Under The Fair Housing Act of
1968, in THE FAIR HOUSING Acr AFrER TwENTY YEARS at 44 (R. Schwemm, ed. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter Schwemm, The Limits of Litigation].
91. HUD's lack of enforcement power can be traced to the Dirksen Compromise. Proponents
of the Fair Housing Act needed Senator Dirksen's support; Dirksen conditioned his support on
HUD relinquishing its power to issue cease and desist order. Id. at 44 (1988).
92. The Supreme Court employed the designation of "private attorneys general" in Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life, 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
93. Kushner cites a number of studies showing that awards for damages and attorney fees are
very much out of line with the costs of litigation. J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING 659 (1983).
94. According to Schwemm, "[o]ver a twenty year period the reported federal court decisions
involving housing discrimination works out to about twenty per year or less than two each month,
far below the number of employment discrimination decisions, which run five to ten times that
amount." Schwemm, The Limits of Litigation, supra note 90 at 46-47.
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B. Starrett City: History of the Development
1. Politics, Compromises and Finances. Significantly, Starrett City
began as a cooperative. 95 As a cooperative project, it would have re-
mained out-of-reach particularly for low income minorities. As the Dis-
trict Court opinion notes, referring to a 1984 New York Housing Survey,
"the problem of decent housing for blacks and other minorities was com-
plicated by the fact that 57,000 rental units were converted to coopera-
tive housing, which limited rental opportunities for blacks and
minorities." 96 If Starrett City had been built as originally planned, as a
cooperative, it would not have increased the available stock of housing
for blacks. This fact becomes important when assessing the charge that
Starrett City's policy harmed innocent black housing seekers, the very
people the policy was designed to help.
Furthermore, various forces molded Starrett City into not only a
rental project, but also into an integrated one. Starrett City would not
have gotten beyond the planning stage if its developer had not assured
the New York City Board of Estimate that it would create a racially
integrated community. 9 7 Starrett City needed approval of the Board in
order to take advantage of the considerable tax abatements originally
granted.98 Political opposition to Starrett City had formed based on the
fear of Starrett City's becoming an overwhelming minority develop-
ment.99 The Board came "under intense political pressure from Canar-
sie, the mostly white, conservative community" just west of the site."°
Even with the assurance from Starrett City's developers that it would
create an integrated community, the local Brooklyn Borough President
still voted against the project.10 1 Starrett City began with considerable
political opposition stacked against it. Moreover, under a 15 year agree-
ment with HUD, Starrett City had to rent at least 1,000 units to Very
Low Income Families (those whose income does not exceed 80% of the
medium income for the area)."0 2 Given this kind of interaction between
95. See Hellman, supra note 84, at 55.
96. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F.Supp. at 674 n.3.
97. Id at 671.
98. See id at 670.
99. Id From 1960 to 1970 East New York went from 2/3 white to 3/4 black. Concomitantly,
property values plummeted and the crime rate rose. Double Reverse Discrimination, supra note 1, at
14.
100. Hellman, supra note 84, at 55. See generally Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 8, Starrett
City (citing Rosenberg Aff.) (discussing the opposition faced by developers of the Starrett City rental
housing development).
101. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. at 670.
102. Id. at 671.
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Starrett City and the government, Starrett City's claim that it functioned
as a state actor becomes more plausible. 103
Starrett City procured finances through governmental and private
sources. HUD's payments to the Housing Finance Agency ("HFA") re-
duced from 8.5% to 1% the interest rate that Starrett City otherwise
would have had to pay on its mortgage. 104 HFA had received more than
$211 million from HUD on Starrett City's behalf by March 1986.105 In-
vestment bankers saved millions of tax dollars by investing in subsidized
rental housing, such as Starrett City, because at the time it was the best
tax shelter available. 11 6 Taxpayers' money heavily subsidized Starrett
City in terms of investment capital. Although private investors made
contributions of about $19 million, the Housing Finance Agency*(HFA)
of the State of New York issued a mortgage loan to Starrett of nearly
$363 million. 107
2. Site Selection. One closing observation should round out this
portion of the contextual picture. The Starrett City developers did all
that they could to make the project appealing to non-minority prospec-
tive tenants. Construction began on the north side where the site bor-
dered on East New York. This was a logical place from a construction
point of view to begin the project because of its access to water pipes and
electric lines.108 However, the planners, in order to prevent prospective
tenants from seeing the adjoining urban blight of East New York, sus-
pended construction at an additional cost of over $1 million, and
changed the location of the building site.1 9
Even though hiding the surrounding blight from prospective tenants
is not the most forthright practice, this action does not undermine the
overall importance of the project's location-in the midst of a ghetto.
103. The District Court found that Starrett City was a private landlord "not clothed in govern-
mental authority." Starrett City, 660 F. Supp. at 678. Yet, the history of the project shows the
developer's actions inextricably intermingled with the government at practically every stage.
Throughout its history, Starrett City acted in consultation with and often at the behest of govern-
mental agencies in developing and implementing its integration maintenance plan. HUD approved
of Starrett City's integration maintenance plan and rejected attempts to include prohibitions on inte-
gration maintenance in its regulations. Recent Developments, supra note 11 at 565 n.22 (citing 54
Fed. Reg. 3235 (daily ed., Jan. 23, 1989)). That fact should provide sufficient governmental clothing
to bring Starrett City more under the umbrella of Otero than the courts seem willing to admit.
104. Starrett City, 660 F.Supp. at 671.
105. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1104 (Newman,J. dissenting).
106. Hellman, supra note 84, at 55.
107. Starrett City, 660 F. Supp. at 670.
108. See Hellman, supra note 84, at 56.
109. Ia
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The controversy over Starrett City's integration maintenance plan pales
in comparison to the problems generated by selecting sites for entire
projects, because the latter has a much more dramatic impact on racism.
This is true particularly if the site, unlike Starrett City, is located outside
areas of minority concentration. Large numbers of minorities move as a
result of site selection decisions. If the housing project is located in a
largely white area, large numbers of minorities may move there, and
greatly affect overall housing patterns. An integration maintenance
scheme, on the other hand, tends to affect the racial housing patterns of
relatively fewer minorities.
Although public housing cannot legally be limited to or prohibited
from minority areas, 110 the realistic prospects for locating minority pub-
lic housing projects in the suburbs are small. This observation illustrates
the importance of considering Starrett City's location. The doctrinal
analysis manages to place the site location variable in the background.
Yet, whether Starrett City was built in a minority area, on the periphery
of a ghetto, or in a largely white area is significant. The developer built
Starrett City between a minority area (Fast New York) and a blue collar
area (Canarsie).111 Starrett City's location cannot be conveniently rele-
gated to irrelevant background information; it molded its development at
every turn.
The neighborhood of Canarsie borders Starrett City.112 An appreci-
ation of the complex dynamics underlying this largely blue-collar, middle
income, Italian and Jewish neighborhood enhances an understanding of
Starrett City. The people of Canarsie feel threatened by what they per-
ceive as the encroaching ghettoes of Bedford Stuyvesant, Brownsville,
and East New York to its north. Whites, mostly immigrants, fled from
those areas into places like Canarsie.113 To the white occupants of the
110. Housing developments cannot be limited to minority areas. See Gautreaux v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 296 F.Supp. 907 (N.D. IM. 1969). Nor can housing projects be prohibited from minor-
ity areas. See Congressional amendment to Housing Act in 1980 providing that HUD could build
public housing in minority areas. Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, PuB. L. No.
96-399, § 216, 94 Stat. 1614 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1436b (1988)).
111. Double Reverse Discrimination, supra note 1, at 14.
112. Ia
113. Many residents of Canarsie had been New Deal liberals, but their flight did much to
change that:
When the people of Canarsie ran from East New York and Brownsville, they ran from
their New Deal concepts of integration. They accepted the concept of civil rights, liberty
for all, and freedom of expression until it impinged on them and their basic right to
maintain the kind of society which doesn't threaten them. The basic fear of the minor-
ity community is participating with them where they live.
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area, Canarsie represented the last stand. In some sense, they saw Star-
rett City as a buffer between themselves and the growing ghettoes that
threaten to engulf Canarsie." 4 Canarsie played a key role in forging the
deal between the Board of Estimates and the developers, a deal that con-
ditioned the Starrett City project on an integration maintenance
policy. 115
Starrett City sits just one exit down the Belt Parkway from Howard
Beach,116 the scene of some recent horrifying racial tensions.117 Starrett
City's experiment in integrated housing stood in stark contrast to other
projects in New York City. Many such projects tipped and became seg-
regated-Rochdale Village, Lefrak City, Fairfield Towers (right across
the street from Starrett City) and Pink Houses. Others, such as the
Mitchell-Lama projects, started out and remain almost totally white.' 18
C. Starrett City: History of Case
The history of the Starrett City case traces back to 1979 when a
group of black applicants brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York." 9 Four years later, in 1983, the
court certified a plaintiff class.' 20 The individual representatives of the
class in this case waited a considerable amount of time, up to four years,
before even a prospect of redress began to form. In March 1985, the
parties stipulated to a settlement and entered into a consent decree' 2 '
which required Starrett City to make available an additional 35 units per
year for five years to black and minority tenants, thereby increasing the
J. RIEDER, CANARSIE: THE JEws AND ITALIANS OF BRooKLYN AGAINsT LIBERALISM 56-57
(1985) (quoting a resident of Canarsie).
114. Ironically, the word "Canarsie" comes from the Algonquian word meaning fort, fenced
land, or palisade. See i. at 13.
115. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 7-8, Starrett City (citing Rosenberg Aff. and
Goldwin Aff.).
116. Memorandum of Law of Concerned Public Officials and Civil Rights Housing and Com-
munity Organizations as Amicus Curiae in support of Starrett City's Petition for Rehearing at 5.
117. See Hornblower, N.Y Marchers Protest Racial Attack, Hundreds Gather in Neighborhood
Where Black Child Died in Chase, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
118. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 12, Starrett City.
119. Saundra and Joseph Perceival, both professional nurses, and 4 others initiated the original
suit. Hellman, supra note 84, at 55.
120. Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs., 98 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
121. Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs., 605 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See Stipulation and
Consent Decree in Arthur v. Starrett City Associates, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (No. 79-cv-3096) (1985), in Petition for Writ of Certiorari 1-20 [here-
inafter Consent Decree].
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minority ceiling for the project. 2 2 In addition, the New York State Divi-
sion of Housing and Community Renewal ("DHCR") agreed to give pri-
ority to minority applicants on Starrett City's waiting list in other,
predominantly white, projects. 12 3 The significance of the consent decree
is that it represents an attempt to alleviate the plight of those allegedly
harmed by Starrett City's policy. Furthermore, no member of the class,
including 8,000 minority applicants on the waiting list,124 objected to the
settlement. 125
A class action suit and a subsequent consent decree seem to repre-
sent the preferred way of attacking the integration maintenance policy
because inter alia, the people directly affected by the policy influence the
dispute resolution. Although Starrett City's integration maintenance
policy harmed the individuals who initiated the law suit, the harm ex-
tended beyond those individuals to the entire group of minority appli-
cants. A class action suit addresses the interests of potential victims of
the alleged discrimination. 126
The plaintiffs in the Arthur case sought primarily injunctive relief
and only secondarily money damages.' 27 The suit classified as a Rule
23(b)(2) 128 class action for injunctive relief in contrast to a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action that allows for money damages.' 9 The former, unlike the
latter, does not require that all members of the class receive notice nor
does it afford class members who seek punitive damages an opportunity
to opt out of the class.' 30 However, under Rule 23(e), the settlement of
the class action must get approval from the court in order to assure that
the settlement protects the interests of absent class members.' 31 In order
122. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1098.
123. See id at 1105 (Newman, J., dissenting). The consent decree thereby opened up a consid-
erable amount of housing for minority applicants since many of the 86 projects specified in the
decree were totally white or nearly so. Hellman, supra note 84, at 56.
124. See Hellman, supra note 84, at 56.
125. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1105 (Newman, J., dissenting).
126. In order to be certified as a class, the plaintiffs must meet the prerequisites to a class action:
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and representation. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Before certifying a
class, the court must be persuaded that the plaintiffs bringing the suit will fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class. Id.
127. Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs., 98 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
128. FED. P. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The rule states that a class action may be maintained if "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making final injunctive relief.., with respect to the class as a whole." Id.
129. Id at 23(b)(3). A rule 23(b)(3) class action involves individuals who coulft sue alone but a
class action is preferable. Id.
130. Id. at 23(c)(2)-(3).
131. Id. at 23(e).
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to effect this, all class members must have adequate notice of the settle-
ment.132 Therefore, although the individuals on the waiting list had the
power to object to the consent decree, they did not. In other words,
enough procedural safeguards were in place to reasonably assure the pro-
tection of all those affected.
Given the relative satisfaction of everyone involved in the settle-
ment, the Justice Department's continued intervention after the Arthur
parties settled becomes more difficult to understand. 133 However, two
concerns dampen support for the claim that all appeared satisfied and
help explain the Justice Department's intervention. First, the court may
have simply "rubber stamped" the consent decree without adequately
protecting the interests of all class members. 13  Although the plaintiffs
probably could not have successfully insisted on the dismantling of Star-
rett City's integration maintenance program, the class presumably could
have struck a better deal, such as, an incremental raising of the minority
ceiling. Nevertheless, the arrangement made by the class representatives
appears fair because it achieved a redistribution of the housing stock
available to minorities. 35
The second concern is that in reaching the settlement, the class rep-
resentatives may have served their own interests, rather than the interests
of those class members they purportedly represented. The settlement
took place very soon after the Open Housing Center, a grass roots organ-
ization that supplied legal counsel for plaintiffs, lost a substantial com-
munity action grant, and the group did not desire a long trial.'36
However, neither the issue of rubber stamping nor the class representa-
tive's financial difficulties seems to have entered the Justice Department's
calculation of whether to continue the suit. The Department's failure to
address these issues makes suspicious its claim that it initiated the suit to
better protect minority interests.
132. Id.
133. The government began its suit against Starrett City in June 1984. Brief for Defendants-
Appellants at 2, Starrett City. The Arthur settlement was reached in March of 1985. See Consent
Decree, supra note 121, at 1-20.
134. See Resnick, Judging Consent, 43 U. CHI. L. F. 43, 88 (1987). However, as Resnick points
out, a judge should make an independent determination of the adequacy of the settlement and not
act as a rubber stamp. Idi
135. The Division of Housing and Community Renewal adopted a program to make more
apartments available to minorities. See Consent Decree, supra note 121, at 1-9.
136. See Hellman, supra note 84, at 56.
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D. Reagan Administration Politics
Unlike school desegregation and employment discrimination cases,
Starrett City cuts across traditional ideological lines. Some of those op-
posed to the use of quotas came to the defense of their use in this case.
Others, generally in favor of quotas, found themselves in opposition to
their use in this instance. The opposing counsels in Starrett City symbol-
ize the paradoxical nature of this case.13 7
Starrett City hired Morris B. Abram as its attorney. 138 As a civil
rights attorney and as a member of the Reagan administration's Civil
Rights Commission, Abram publicly proclaimed his acceptance of color-
blind ideals. Abram opposed affirmative action plans as illegitimate uses
of quotas. 13 9 Yet Abram found himself in the role of defending Starrett
City's quotas. 4' Although lawyers quite often defend clients in cases
that run counter to their personal beliefs, Abram's predicament symbol-
izes the kinds of contradictory strains running throughout this case.
The policy of integration is normally associated with organizations
like the National Association of Colored People ("NAACP"). However,
the NAACP represented individuals opposed to Starrett City's integra-
tion maintenance policy; it took the side of the five blacks who sued on
grounds of discrimination.' 4' Yet to date the NAACP has not adopted a
policy on integration maintenance. 42 Attacking a particular quota sys-
tem and failing to devise a national policy on that issue raises no inherent
contradictions. Again, the NAACP's waffling on this issue symbolizes
the conflicting pulls that underlie our collective reactions to racial
issues. 143
137. See generally Double Reverse Discrimination, supra note 1, at 14 (the author analyzes the
complex relationship between the opposing counsels and their ideologies).
138. See id
139. See Abram, What Constitutes CivilRights?, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at
52; Liberalism and the Jews, A Symposium, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1980, at 15; Morris, Democrats
Take a Stand on Race Preferences, Wall St. J., June 15, 1984, at 30, col. 2.
140. Double Reverse Discrimination, supra note 1 , at 15.
141. Id at 16.
142. Hankins, Starrett City and Other Race-Conscious Methods of Achieving Integration, in THE
FAIR HOUSING Acr AFTER TWENTY YEARS, at 110 (R. Schwemm ed. 1988).
143. For example, Rieder recounts a meeting of citizens following a racial fight at Canarsie
High School, located near Starrett City, in the fall of 1966. The debate turned to the composition of
the largely black security force, wherein black adults began to argue for a color-blind norm of merit
while the whites lauded the merits of quotas for white security guards. See J. RIEDER, supra note
113, at 190 (1985). The busing of Russian Jewish children into the Canarsie public schools to com-
pensate for the declining white enrollments provides another ironic twist. Id. at 194-95. Blacks
promoting color-blindness and whites advocating quotas and busing illustrates the unexpected posi-
tions groups take when confronted with racial issues.
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William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant United States Attorney filled
the role as the Reagan "administration's point man in its effort to dis-
mantle affirmative action quotas."'" Most affirmative action programs
attempt to help minorities. The Reagan administration's attack on af-
firmative action programs did not endear it to many members of the civil
rights community. Starrett City provided Reynolds with an opportunity
to "show [that] his hatred of quotas" was "pure.' 145
According to Reynolds, in the 1950s the civil rights movement ad-
vocated a color-blind philosophy that did not include affirmative ac-
tion.' 41 Reynolds saw the civil rights movement going astray when in
the 1970s, "the quest for equality of opportunity for individuals began in
some quarters gradually to evolve into an insistence upon equality of re-
sults for groups."' 47 In Reynold's view, quotas fly in the face of "the
uniquely American belief in the primacy of the individual."' 148
In June 1984, the government commenced the action against Star-
rett City. 4 9 Justice Newman's dissent indicates his suspicion of the gov-
ernment's motives in filing the suit: "[i]ust one month after the
settlement was reached, the United States filed this suit, ostensibly con-
cerned with vindication of the rights of the same minority applicants for
housing who had just settled their dispute on favorable terms."'' 0 How-
ever, Reynolds claims that the Justice Department "only zoomed in
when we saw that the NAACP took a dive,"'' implying that the Reagan
administration came to the rescue of the NAACP in this suit.
In 1988 Starrett City was one of two Title VIII civil cases won by
the Justice Department at the trial level. The other involved a claim of
discriminatory municipal services against American Indians in Northern
Michigan.'5 2 The Reagan administration's enforcement of the Fair
Housing Act was at best, a feeble attempt. From 1968 to 1978, the Jus-
tice Department filed three hundred housing discrimination suits; during
the Carter administration, sixty-six cases; during the first term of the
144. Hellman, supra note 84, at 55.
145. Id.
146. Reynolds notes that the school children's attorney in Brown v. Board of Education,
Thurgood Marshall, urged the Court to adopt a color-blind philosophy. Reynolds, Individualism vs.
Group Right. The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE LJ. 995, 998 (1984).
147. Id. at 1001.
148. Id. at 1003.
149. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1105 (Newman, J., dissenting).
150. Id
151. See Hellman, supra note 84, at 56.
152. Schwemm, Fair Housing Act When Good Intentions Aren't Enough, LEGAL TIMEs at 20,
col. 1 (May 16, 1988).
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Reagan administration, seven. 153 In contrast to the Reagan Justice De-
partment's reluctance to fie Fair Housing Act suits, the consent decree
in Arthur represents one of many it attacked. The Department assailed
other consent decrees "that settled previous anti-discrimination cases in
51 cities, counties, school districts and state agencies."1 54
Attacking consent decrees in this manner seems contrary to the
Reagan Administration's general philosophy in favor of voluntary agree-
ment without government interference.1 55 Given the sparseness of gov-
ernmental enforcement of the Act, the Government's concerted efforts
against Starrett City begin to take on an air of suspicion. The govern-
ment expended considerable resources suing Starrett City, although the
parties adopted a consent decree.15 6 A deeper economic philosophy op-
posed to government support for the redistribution of public goods to
minorities may have motivated the Administration in its housing policy.
The facts described in this Part would not play an important role in
the doctrinal analysis. Yet, eliminating the contextual details from an
examination of the case distorts our understanding of Starrett City. It
did not evolve in isolation. In light of the historical context, Starrett
City's policy of integration maintenance gains plausibility because it en-
hances one's understanding of the goals of its developers - what they
intended to accomplish. On the other hand, reliance on the bare-bone
facts recited at the outset of the Article results in almost immediate con-
demnation of Starrett City's use of racial quotas. Thus, the rich array of
facts described here in Part II lend considerable support to Starrett City's
policy. Part III illustrates how the contextual details provide a means for
choosing between the three principles at stake in this case: anti-discrimi-
nation, color-blindness, and pro-integration.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE CouRTs' ANALYSES
Part I described the doctrinal analysis of Starrett City. Part II un-
ravelled the detailed intricacies of the story surrounding Starrett City.
Now Part III explores the ways in which the contextual understanding
supports Starrett City's policy.
153. See Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas, supra note 7, at 243-44 & nn.
204-205 (citing Wolvovitz & Lobel, The Enforcement of the Civil Rights Statutes: The Reagan Ad-
ministration's Record, 9 BLACK L.J 252, 257-258 (1986)).
154. Davidson & Watkins, Civil Rights Under Reagan, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
155. See K. PHILLIPS, THE POLMCS OF RICH AND POOR 93 (1990).
156. See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Consent Decree and
the Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs. case.
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For the purposes of the analysis, certain parts of this section conflate
the similar but distinct decisions by the District Court and the Second
Circuit. Basically, both courts saw Starrett City as addressing the wrong
harm (tipping) with the incorrect remedy (racial quotas) in violation of a
sacrosanct principle (anti-discrimination). The developers of Starrett
City, on the other hand, saw tipping as an early warning sign of urban
decay and employed integration maintenance as a stop-gap remedy to
promote integration. The following is an attempt to shed light on the
three areas of dispute - harm, remedy, and principle- through a con-
textual analysis.
A. The Harm: Tipping
The District Court called into the question Starrett City's reliance
on the tipping phenomenon."5 7 According to the tipping principle,
"white families will abandon and avoid a given housing development or
neighborhood after the black percentage of the population exceeds a cer-
tain point... ."I" The court became particularly disturbed at one of
Starrett's own experts, Oscar Newman, acknowledging that tipping
could occur over a wide range, "from a low of 1% black to a high of
60% black." '159
The District Court's attack on the empirical foundations of tipping
prove woefully misplaced. Even granting the unreliability of most pre-
dictions from the social sciences, the court missed the point of the tipping
phenomenon. The issue is not whether social scientists can accurately
predict precisely the point at which tipping will occur; the court confuses
two levels of inquiry. The first level sets forth the range within which
tipping occurs. Newman's claim that tipping happens anywhere between
1 to 60% black occupancy rate1" relates to that first range. His claim
seems at least plausible, since some housing developments could tip when
only one black family is present. 61 The second level of inquiry revolves
around the issue of a legitimate tipping range for a particular project
such as Starrett City. The tipping point for Starrett City can be partially
determined from experience with the project. In the case of Starrett City,
157. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F.Supp. at 678.
158. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Con-
trols, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245, 251 (1974).
159. Starrett City, 660 F.Supp. at 678.
160. Id at 674.
161. Newman, Fair Housing: the Conflict Between Integration and Nondiscrimination, in IssuEs
IN HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 177 (1985) (quoting C. RAPKN & W. GRIGSBY, THE DEMAND FOR
HOUSING IN RACIALLY MIXED NEIGHBORHOODS (1960)).
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the racial composition has held steady at 40% minority. Because a rapid
decline in the white occupancy has not occurred, the tipping point has
not fallen below 40%.162
However, granting arguendo that social scientists cannot determine
the exact tipping point nor the tipping range, does that lead us from the
realm of sociological fact to sociological values where tipping becomes
nothing more than a euphemism for a racism index?163 Do whites flee
from integrating areas because of their discriminatory attitude against
blacks? Does tipping in fact give a social science gloss to racism?
In order to approach these questions, take the following proposition:
All whites flee because of their fear of blacks.
The inference that:
All whites flee because of their discriminatory attitude towards blacks,
follows, only if,
'fear of blacks' is equivalent to 'discriminatory attitude towards
blacks.'
However, not all fear adds up to discrimination. Therefore discrimina-
tion must involve a particular kind of fear, ie., a fear based on racial
prejudice, and it must exclude fears based on any other factors. A de-
fense of tipping would then have to find non-prejudicial fears that would
induce whites to flee.
Garry Wills has aptly uncovered the more legitimate factors under-
lying white flight in the following quotation."' The term "tipping"
could easily replace the "desire for 'law and order' ":
The desire for 'law and order' is nothing so simple as a code word for ra-
cism; it is a cry as things begin to break up, for stability, for stopping his-
tory in mid-dissolution. Hammer the structure back together; anchor it
down; bring nails and bolts and clamps to keep it from collapsing. There is
a slide of things-queasy seasickness .... 165
Equally complex motivations underlie the adherence to a law-and-
order philosophy and the phenomenon of white flight. Many factors lead
to white flight.1 66 Variables other than prejudicial fear, such as, "popula-
162. Telephone interview with William Ruddick, Public Affairs Associate for Grenadier Realty
Corporation and Starrett City (Aug. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Telephone interview].
163. See Current Issues, supra note 44, at 30.
164. See G. WILLS, NIXON AcoNISTEs: THE CRISIS OF THE SELF-MADE MAN (1970).
165. Id. at 51-52.
166. See Current Issues, supra note 44, at 29-30. According to one writer, "it is not obvious
that this [white flight] is a manifestation of the racial attitudes of the inhabitants involved." Id.
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tion growth, employment opportunities, housing stock, real estate activ-
ity, and the presence of community groups" help account for the
existence or lack of white flight and urban blight.67
The fear of urban blight is a variable in tipping analysis. In examin-
ing the racial implications of that fear, one must ask, does tipping theory
simply legitimate a discriminatory conflation of "minority" with "unde-
sirable"?168 Or does the concentration of racial minorities necessarily re-
sult in urban blight?169 At least one court has acknowledged the
connection between racial concentration with urban blight: "[i]ncrease or
maintenance of racial concentration [of minorities] is prima facie likely
to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance with the na-
tional housing policy."' 17
One need not harbor racist attitudes in order to draw this connec-
tion. 71 Analogously, many whites want good schools for their children.
If they flee from a neighborhood with inferior schools to one with better
schools, that does not necessarily imply racist attitudes on their part even
if their move takes them from a predominantly black neighborhood to a
white one.
One should be wary of imputing racist attitudes on all housing deci-
sions. Presumably racial minorities could (and undoubtedly do) harbor
prejudicial attitudes against the white majority. If a black family refuses
to be the pioneer to move into an all white neighborhood, we do not
invoke racism, even if the family members might be or are prejudiced. In
that case, instead of emphasizing the racial attitudes of the family in
question, the contextual analysis rightfully shifts to the difficulties the
family would face in that situation. The tipping analysis, alternatively,
can be seen as making a similar adjustment in focus, away from the atti-
tudes, racial and otherwise, and towards the contextual conditions.
If the District Court had looked closer at Starrett City, it would
have found an experiment designed to retard the decay of urban housing
167. Id.
168. One author suggests that "tipping point theory approves this 'minority' to 'undesirable'
analogy." Id. at 32.
169. The complex interplay of factors underlying tipping can best be illustrated by noting how
difficult it is to separate out issues of race from issues of poverty.
170. Shannon v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3rd Cir.
1970). See Farrell, Integrating by Discriminating Affirmative Action that Disadvantages Minorities,
62 DET. C. L. REv. 553, 565 (1985). Farrell notes the "inherently racist overtones of this language."
Id.
171. Starrett City's attorney, Morris Abram predicted that a decision against Starrett would
"'create a segregated wasteland.'" Starrett City Will Stop Using Quotas to Foster Integration, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1988, at B4, col. 1.
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by promoting an integrated community. Tipping accounted for a small
portion of Starrett City's concerns. Along with preventative measures
designed to halt tipping, Starrett City also tried to build something posi-
tive, a community.
B. The Remedy: Integration Maintenance
The Second Circuit used a three pronged test172 in Starrett City.
According to that test, a race-conscious plan must be temporary; 173 it
must remedy prior discrimination; 174 and it should not deny access of
minorities to housing.' 7  Each prong of the test confronts difficulties
when applied to the context of Starrett City.
1. Temporary Remedies. The Second Circuit's first criterion raises
a number of questions, such as, just how temporary is temporary? Can a
quota or a target be temporarily invoked at various times over a long
period of time depending on the changing conditions? The Supreme
Court approved a plan authorizing temporary "targets" to remedy gen-
der discrimination in Johnson v. Transportation Agency. 176 The court ap-
proved the plan even though the Agency's target would not be achieved
in a brief period of time because of the small turnover in road construc-
tion jobs.177 Professor James Kushner suggests that Starrett City could
draft a similar temporary triggering program "where, if the racial mix
reaches a certain percentage-it might be 60 percent or 70 percent mi-
nority-at that point a temporary program would be instituted... [i]t
would again dissolve as soon as the mix came back to 50/50 or whatever
the mix might be."' 78
Although Starrett City could devise a plan with more temporary
characteristics, it still might construe the implementation of its current
integration maintenance plan as a temporary devise. At the time of the
172. The three pronged test allows the court to avoid constant judicial supervision. See Note,
United States v. Starrett City Associates; 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), 36 WASH. J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 279, 287. The "three-pronged test correctly eliminates the need for continuous judicial
supervision." Id.
173. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1101.
174. Id at 1102.
175. Id
176. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, noted that the Agency's Plan did not set aside positions for women but merely authorized
affirmative action as a relevant factor in the consideration of candidates. Id. at 638.
177. Id. at 639.
178. See Kushner, Starrett City and Other Race-Conscious Methods of Achieving Integration, in
THE FAIR HousiNo Acr AFrER TWENTY YEARs at 110-11 (R. Schwemm ed. 1988).
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decision, the quotas had been in effect for ten years and the developers
predicted another fifteen years for the policy 179 until Starrett City's inte-
gration maintenance program would achieve its goal of stable integra-
tion."' Stable integration is evidenced by a consistently low turnover
rate. At the time of the litigation for this case, it was simply too soon to
determine whether stability had been achieved.
However, even if the long term focus of Starrett City's project pre-
cludes "temporary" status, factors such as its location' 8' support the du-
ration of its policy. Starrett City may have to implement long-term
measures in order to meet its goal of stable integration. A more pro-
longed program seems necessary because minorities constitute the vast
majority of those awaiting approval for an apartment in Starrett City.
A connection between high minority occupancy and housing deteri-
oration becomes effective at the point where infrastructure support for
the housing project gets withdrawn. Starrett City would argue that inte-
gration maintenance serves as a guarantor of the infrastructure support.
Accordingly, this infrastructure support helps insure better schools and
safer neighborhoods.
2. Prior Discrimination. The second prong of the Second Circuit's
test requires that Starrett City's racial conscious policy remedy its acts of
prior discrimination. The court found no evidence of "prior racial dis-
crimination or discriminatory imbalance adversely affecting whites
within Starrett City.' 81 2 This analysis does not fully comport with the
Supreme Court's subsequent analysis in Richmond v. Croson.'
1 3
In Croson the majority struck down the City of Richmond's affirma-
tive action plan. The City Council, in 1983 adopted a plan which "re-
quired prime contractors to whom the city awarded construction
contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of the con-
179. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1102.
180. Id
181. Colleen McMahon, one of Starrett City's attorneys, describes Starrett's situation:
Starrett City is sited on a garbage dump next to a racially segregated slum. It is across
the street and around the corner from two previously built, federally assisted housing
projects that tipped almost immediately and are now segregated by both race and class.
It is thirteen miles from Manhattan. It has no direct public transportation. It is cut off
on all sides from the white neighborhoods that surround it and is adjacent and accessible
only to the black neighborhood of east New York that is on one side of it. It is under a
direct Kennedy Airport flight path.
See McMahon, Starrett City and Other Race-Conscious Methods of Achieving Integration, in THE
FAIR HousING AcT AFrER TwENY YEARs at 111-12 (R. Schwemm ed. 1988).
182. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102.
183. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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tract to one or more Minority Business Enterprise (MBE's).' ' 18 4 The
Court held that the city could not implement its remedial plan because it
had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public
contracting on the basis of race and also that past societal discrimination
alone was not enough to support rigid racial prejudices. 18 5 However,
Justice O'Connor's opinion indicated that the city could have taken af-
firmative steps if it demonstrated that it had at least a passive role in
perpetuating racial discrimination in the construction industry, as a
whole.18 6
Under the standard utilized by the Second Circuit and the Croson
Court, Starrett City would be required to show that it was remedying
some act of past discrimination. The Second Circuit's analysis would
require Starrett City to show it was remedying past discrimination while
O'Connor's analysis would require Starrett City to demonstrate discrimi-
nation by other developers in filling housing projects in the area, rather
than its own past discrimination. That showing does not seem beyond
Starrett City's reach given the segregated status of housing developments
in the area.'8 7
Starrett City developed at a time and place where integrated housing
developments were extremely rare. It represents an attempt to correct a
discriminatory trend toward segregated housing throughout the housing
field. Ironically, Starrett City would have a much stronger legal position
under the Second Circuit's analysis if it had first implemented a clearly
discriminatory policy. Thus, Starrett City's race-conscious housing pol-
icy would only be justified if it was an attempt to remedy its own past
discrimination.
3. Impact on Minorities. The final prong in the test exhibits the
court's concern for the impact of the quota system on minorities:
Starrett's quotas do not provide minorities with access to Starrett City, but
rather act as a ceiling to their access. Thus, the impact of appellants' prac-
tices falls squarely on minorities, for whom Title VIII was intended to open
up housing opportunities.188
The court's analysis of the impact on minorities lends itself to criticism.
First, Starrett City's policy provided minorities with access to housing in
184. Id. at 477.
185. Id. at 505.
186. Id. at 492. O'Connor's opinion was joined by Justices Rehnquist and White. Id. at 469.
187. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1108; United States v. Starrett City
Assocs. 660 F. Supp. at 674 (citing Newman's studies).
188. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102.
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Starrett City: a housing development which would not have been built
unless its developers had agreed with the Board of Estimates to the inte-
gration maintenance plan.189 Most likely, the minority tenants would
not have had housing of the caliber of Starrett City "but for" Starrett's
policy."9 Secondly, Starrett City's policy, as altered by the consent de-
cree in the previous suit, 19' led to greater access to minority housing.
The consent decree opened up minority access to eighty other, almost
exclusively white, subsidized housing projects in New York City.'92
Starrett City effectively dismantles at least one aspect of the Arthur con-
sent decree because part of the consent decree was to increase the ceiling
quota. Therefore the court's decision, contrary to its own concerns, may
do more harm to minorities than Starrett City's policy because fewer mi-
norities will have access to quality housing.
C. The Principle: Anti-Discrimination
Many judicial opinions and legal thinkers subscribe to the anti-dis-
crimination principle.'93 According to Paul Brest's oft-cited formula-
tion, the anti-discrimination principle "disfavors race-dependent
decisions and conduct-at least when either selectively disadvantage the
members of minority groups."' 94 The anti-discrimination principle ex-
plicitly addresses the harm caused to minorities in its assessment of a
program.
In addition, a notion of equality underlies the anti-discrimination
principle; 195 thus, it would be wrong to treat similarly situated individu-
als differently on the basis of problematic dimensions such as race.
189. See id. at 1104 (Newman, J., dissenting).
190. This fact is almost always ignored in commentaries on Starrett City. Most commentators
agree, without providing their own analysis, that Starrett City's quotas "did not open up housing
opportunities." Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas, supra note 7, at 241-42.
191. See Consent Decree, supra note 121, at 1-7.
192. Id.
193. See generally Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949) for the classical formulation of the principle in the context of equal protection analysis.
194. Brest, Foreword In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6
(1976). Brest cites Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) which required that government agencies
remedy their past discriminatory selection of public housing sites by consciously locating future
projects in predominantly white neighborhoods as decided according to the anti-discrimination prin-
ciple. Id at 3.
195. For example, Farrell proposes that in the housing context, the principle of equality (chosen
behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance) requires similarly situated persons to be treated similarly. See
Farrell, supra note 170, at 576-86. Rawls proposed that we should choose the principles of justice
behind a veil of ignorance so that our particular prejudices do not interfere with rational choice. See
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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However, race-conscious decisions and conduct pose a problem for the
anti-discrimination principle. On the one hand, the principle seems to
completely rule out race-conscious remedies, because by definition, they
do not treat similarly situated people similarly. On the other hand, many
proponents of the anti-discrimination principle make allowances for
some forms of affirmative action.196 Proponents skirt around the di-
lemma by accepting race-conscious remedies only when they benefit mi-
norities. If a race-conscious decision denies benefits to minorities, the
decision violates the principle of equality since minorities do not benefit.
The acceptance of a race-conscious program hinges on whether or not it
benefits minorities. Through the use of occupancy ceilings, Starrett City
excluded some minority applicants from the project, denied them a bene-
fit, and thereby violated this interpretation of the anti-discrimination
principle.
However, applying such an interpretation of the anti-discrimination
principle creates difficulties. For example, does this interpretation of the
anti-discrimination principle preclude any denial of benefits to any mi-
nority person? If it does, then it must be rejected because no matter what
program gets implemented, it will likely have some adverse affect on
some minority person; a program designed only to benefit minorities will
have an adverse affect on some minority individuals, simply by preclud-
ing them from participation. Alternatively, policies condemned under
the anti-discrimination principle, such as segregation, can actually benefit
some minority members. For example, benefits accrue to some minority
members from their attendance of segregated schools. 197
If the anti-discrimination principle manifests a concern for innocent
victims, then it needs to consistently exercise this concern. Starrett
City's policy discriminates against minorities, a fact admitted to by Star-
rett City.198 However, does not the dismantling of Starrett City's policy
also discriminate? Without integration maintenance, innocent minorities
become victimized because less decent housing is available. In the only
scholarly article defending Starrett City's policy the author argues that:
In a situation where tipping is imminent, racial discrimination is inevitable.
In form, it will be either affirmative, race-conscious action to prevent segre-
gation (as in Otero), or a simple abdication of the duty to prevent segrega-
196. Brest, supra note 194, at 16-19.
197. See Farrell, supra note 170, at 589-93 (citing a number of studies and cases that question
the benefits of integration). For example, black students receive a disproportionate amount of disci-
plinary action in integrated schools. Id. at 589.
198. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 41, Starrett City. Starrett City described its policy
as "admittedly burden[ing] minorities." Id.
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tion (Starrett City without its quota).' 99 (citations omitted).
By rejecting Starrett City's integration maintenance policy, the Sec-
ond Circuit opened the door so that a "more segregated project" was
"'free"' to form2° and violated the very anti-discrimination principle it
relied on to reject Starrett City's ceiling.21' Presumably, the court would
have allowed Starrett City to raise rents to a point where a greater per-
centage of minorities are adversely affected than non-minorities, resulting
in a de facto integration maintenance policy. In its attempt to prevent
harm from falling upon innocent victims by striking down Starrett City's
policy, the court uses the anti-discrimination principle to indirectly harm
other innocent victims.
The defenders of the court's use of the anti-discrimination principle
could reply that this critique of the anti-discrimination approach fails to
distinguish race-conscious decisions from race related consequences.
Even if the court's decision had adversely affected minorities, that is a
very different situation than that brought about by Starrett City's policy.
The anti-discrimination principle condemns certain kinds of race-con-
scious decisions; it does not reject every consequence found to negatively
affect a racial minority. In other words, because Starrett City invokes
racial categories, its policy deserves condemnation under the anti-dis-
crimination principle. The court merely takes a stand against the use of
racial categories that do not benefit racial minorities; it cannot prevent
every harmful effect on racial minorities. Thus, it would be condemned
under this interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle.
Distinguishing between race-conscious decisions and race related
consequences fails to address the court's implication that race-conscious
categories should not be used. By rejecting the use of racial categories,
the court implies that Starrett City should not use racial categories. Yet,
stripping Starrett City of its integration maintenance program amounts
to accepting segregated housing.20 2 Affirming segregated housing devel-
opments in turn yields race-consciousness. The court's decision against
Starrett City's policy effectively affirms segregated housing.
199. Note, Racial Integration in Urban Public Housing, supra note 9, at 374.
200. Id. at 375.
201. Id. ("Every benign discriminatory measure which the courts have allowed violates the Act
to the same degree-that is, completely.") Id
202. Given that the overwhelming number of applicants on the waiting list are minority mem-
bers, the numbers indicate that it will only be a matter of time before Starrett City becomes segre-
gated. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. at 672-73 (table setting forth the
number and percentage of units Starrett City occupied by each racial and ethnic group from 1975-
84).
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More importantly, the court's decision not only sanctions segregated
housing, it also indirectly encourages the type of segregated housing as-
sociated with urban blight. By refusing to explore the possibility that
integration maintenance might benefit racial minorities, the court avoids
inquiry into the consequences. However, when invoking the anti-dis-
crimination principle, one should assess the use of racial categories in
light of consequences. For example, the court claims concern for inno-
cent victims-those minority members denied access to a certain quality
of housing.20 3 Part of the court's concern for innocent victims is an in-
terest in what will happen to those victims. Actually, the court's decision
may have greater adverse consequence than the integration maintenance
policy. Integration maintenance enhances rather than negatively affects
minority access to quality housing. In contrast, the court's decision
makes decent housing for innocent minority occupants and prospective
occupants of Starrett City less likely. Hence, the court's position as an
advocate of the anti-discrimination principle is undermined by its con-
cern for minorities.
Defenders of the anti-discrimination principle can counter criticisms
by distinguishing between types of race-conscious programs. The type of
access at stake in housing differs from that in education and employment
because it involves nonmeritocratic access issues, whereas education and
employment pose meritocratic questions of access. Housing does not
take ability or disability into account. 2' Starrett City's race-conscious
policy, unlike race-conscious programs in education and employment,
does not attempt to compensate for lack of qualifications among mem-
bers of excluded groups.20 5
While merit plays a role in the education/employment areas, and
not in the housing area, this is essentially a distinction without a differ-
ence. The meritorious nature of the activity does not determine the ap-
plicability of racial categories. In all of these realms - education,
employment, and housing - race-conscious programs attempt to com-
pensate for a lack of opportunity. However, are the types of opportunity
at stake in education/employment and housing the same?
Some claim that quotas in the education or employment context dif-
203. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1102.
204. See Note, Racial Integration in Urban Public Housing, supra note 9, at 383.
205. According to one author, "[i]n the employment and educational affirmative action cases
courts are primarily concerned with the 'unfair' effects of race-conscious measures on 'innocent vic-
tims' who might be better qualified." Recent Developments, supra note 11, at 573. On the other
hand, "race-conscious housing measures do not suffer from the claims of 'better qualified innocent
victims.' Id.
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fer from those in housing since "the former are access quotas used to
provide opportunities to those previously denied of such social goods, the
latter limit minority access to the very housing sought to be integrated"
(emphasis in original).2"6 Thus, according to the above distinction, quo-
tas are inextricably linked to discrimination in the housing context.
How one characterizes the social good in question determines
whether the above distinction between the uses of the quotas holds. If
the public good is described as housing in general, Starrett City's policy
denied housing to some applicants who would have otherwise obtained
residency at Starrett City. Yet, the distinction between quotas and ceil-
ings blurs when the public or social good is characterized as stable neigh-
borhood housing. The housing quotas then appear more like the quotas
in education and employment. The housing quota is used to provide an
opportunity for stable neighborhood housing, a social good previously
denied to minorities. Therefore, it is quite plausible to claim that Starrett
City's policy does not deny minority applicants stable neighborhood
housing even if it does, in some sense, deny them housing.
Proponents of the anti-discrimination principle often assert a rela-
tionship between the race-conscious program and stigmatization." 7 Ac-
cordingly, a "quota limiting the number of blacks in any complex
inevitably implies that blacks are undesirable. ' 20 8  The government
raised a similar concern in Starrett City: "It]he racist notion that blacks
and Hispanics possess characteristics that make them unfit tenants is ex-
actly the kind of stereotyped slur that the Equal Protection Clause and
the Fair Housing Act cannot tolerate." 2' However, the question re-
mains: does restricting minority access automatically stigmatize?210
There are at least two different senses of "stigmatize ' "- the psycho-
logical and the sociological. With respect to the psychological sense,
race-conscious policies stigmatize in that they make members of the ra-
cial minority feel inferior because the race-conscious policy targets them
primarily because of their race and not for other more noble reasons.
206. Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas, supra note 7, at 203.
207. See, ag., Farrell, supra note 170, at 559.
208. Id.
209. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 30, n.12, Starrett City.
210. "To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See
also Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas, supra note 7, at 211 n.55. The author
asserts that "[r]egressive racial quotas simply reinforce racial stereotypes and stigmatic harm, the
enduring source of injustice." Id at 226.
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Evidence of minority residents of Starrett City feeling psychologically
inferior is scant. According to one study, "the great preponderance of
black residents" favored Starrett City's racial integration.21 '
Did Starrett City's policy stigmatize in the second, sociological
sense, by branding members of the racial minority as less desirable? Here
Starrett City's policy appears more vulnerable: for was not its policy's
implicit message that racial minorities did not deserve this type of hous-
ing because they were less desirable tenants? Starrett City's defense to
that assertion would be that it was not stigmatizing the racial minority;
rather, its policy signalled a stigmatizing or a rejection of the ghetto.
Starrett City rejected the ghetto, not the racial minority. Whether Star-
rett City's policy stigmatized, in any sense of that word, remains highly
questionable.
Overall, the anti-discrimination principle encounters difficulties in
drawing a line between acceptable and non-acceptable race-conscious
programs. Starrett City's policy simply does not do the kinds of things
that the anti-discrimination principle condemns; it does not necessarily
negatively affect innocent minority victims (for example, those on the
waiting list), nor does Starrett City's policy stigmatize members of a ra-
cial minority. Despite theses incongruities, the court seems content to
categorize Starrett City's policy as violating the anti-discrimination
principle.2 12
IV. ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLES
While the courts relied on the anti-discrimination principle, the op-
posing parties advocated color-blindness and pro-integration.
A. Color-Blindness
1. The Principle. The plaintiffs in Starrett City, Reagan and Bush
Administration officials, various justices on the Supreme Court, and
prominent legal scholars have advocated the principle of color-blindness.
Just what is that principle? The elder Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy
v. Ferguson, provided the most often quoted statement of the color-blind
position: "Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor toler-
ates classes among citizens.... The law regards man as man, and takes
211. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp at 674-75 (citing Dr. Kenneth Clark's
study concerning Starrett City). The study was prepared for the New York State Division of Hous-
ing and Community Renewal. See id. at 674.
212. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1101.
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no account of his surroundings or of his color... ,,213 The Constitution,
however, is not color-blind, at least in the sense that it mentions slavery
and allows for the differential treatment of slaves.214 Harlan's statement
therefore must mean that the Constitution should be color-blind.
Professor William Van Aistyne, a noted constitutional scholar, pro-
poses the following reason for why the Constitution should be color-
blind:
[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, reso-
lute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's life--or in the life
and practices of one's government-the differential treatment of other
human beings by race. Indeed, that is the great lesson for government itself
to teach: in all we do in life, whatever we do in life, to treat any person less
well than another or to favor one any more than another for being black or
white or brown or red, is wrong.
215
Accordingly, a justification for using race, even affirmatively, can never
arise. Proponents of color-blindness, in contrast to adherents of the anti-
discrimination principle,216 reject the acceptance of any race-conscious
policy, even a policy designed to aid racial minorities.
Van Alstyne's justification for color-blindness contains two
problems, evidenced in the first phrase of his proposal: "one gets beyond
racism by getting beyond it now" (emphasis mine). The terms he uses
raise the questions of who is "one" and when is "now"?
2. Critique. To highlight the problems, imagine three scenarios,
each with a time line from time to (beginning time) to time t. (ending
time). In Scenario A, race has never been used by anyone from time to to
time t, (a point between time to and time t. Under those conditions, it
follows that use of race, even benignly, for example in an affimative ac-
tion program, is not justified under a color-blindness principle at time
213. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
214. According to John Arthur:
Three provisions of the Constitution explicitly recognize the existence of slavery: the
three-fifths compromise, which apportioned congressmen on the basis of the number of
free persons plus "three fifths of all other persons" (Article I, Section 2); the requirement
that the states "deliver up" fugitive slaves (Article IV, Section 2); and the promise that
the slave trade would not be outlawed before 1808 (Article I, Section 9). Although the
Constitution did not deny that slaves were persons-in fact, it explicitly described them
as such in the three-fifths compromise-it nonetheless excluded them from the ranks of
"citizen."
J. ARTHUR, THE UNFNSHED CONSTITUTION 212 (1989).
215. See Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U.
Cm. L. REv. 775, 809-10 (1979).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 193-96.
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t 1.
2 17 The benign use of race is precluded by Scenario A's assumption
that there has been no negative use of race (La, discrimination) that an
affirmative use needs to combat.
Scenario B, adopted by color-blind adherents, is only slightly more
complex than Scenario A. In Scenario B, some individuals, including the
government, used race negatively from time to to time tI. At time tI, the
government discontinued the negative use of race until time t2 (i e., from,
ti to t2). These conditions do not justify the use of race by the govern-
ment at time t2, because during the time frame, from t, to t2, no negative
uses exist for the benign uses to offset. The time line, t, to t2, in Scenario
B effectively replicates Scenario A where in the color-blind context, af-
firmative action looses its force when the government stops discriminat-
ing. Notice, however, that the color-blind proponent can not
automatically discount the use of race in Scenario B between to and tl,
where a benign use of race could offset the negative use of it.218
Scenario C is much more complicated; it does not use linear time
lines with clear-cut break points. In Scenario C, no one point delineates
when the government uses race in a negative manner and when it ceased
to do so. To delineate a sharp cut-off from discriminatory activity indi-
cates an insensitivity to the lingering effects of past racism. Federal
housing loan policies may no longer explicitly discriminate on the basis
of race,219 but the inertial effect of past discriminatory policies will infect
the composition of our cities and suburbs for some time to come. Being
blind to color means being blind to background conditions and ulti-
mately being blind to social reality itself. Scenario C better depicts the
housing situation than either of the other two scenarios. The color-blind
position assumes the unrealistic situation in Scenario B with a clear-cut
temporal break between negative uses of racial categories and no uses.
The following should make this abstract discussion more concrete.
The use of racial categories at Starrett City should be evaluated in
terms of the background conditions under which they are used. For ex-
ample, Starrett City must be compared to other housing projects. If Star-
rett City were the only housing project to employ minority ceilings in a
housing market where either all of the other housing units were inte-
217. Note that if race was never used by some but was used by others, that leaves open the
possibility ofjustifying the use of race at t, in order to overcome its negative use by certain segments
of the population.
218. Note that a problem arises if any spill-over effects exist between the first time frame (to to
ti) and the second (t, to t2).
219. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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grated or where minority segregated projects were comparable in quality
to nonminority segregated projects, then Starrett City would have a diii-
cult time justifying its policy. However, in an environment where most
of the minority housing projects suffer from deterioration and where
nonminority projects comparatively prosper,22 Starrett City's policies
appear less objectionable.
The color-blind position holds only if it remains blind to contextual
factors. It unsuccessfully tries to stay blind to the realities of color and
race in society. But by condemning wholesale the use of racial catego-
ries, the color-blind position commits itself to the rejection of even those
uses of racial categories that clearly benefit blacks.
Moreover, the color-blindness advocates' avoidance of questions of
redistribution amounts to a pretense. The color-blindness position sup-
ports the status quo in terms of distributional patterns. Behind race
stand the disparate power relations and the inevitable distribution of pub-
lie goods. The status quo by its very nature precludes efforts to change
these relations and distributions. By refusing to accept redistributional
efforts based on race, the color-blind principle drifts quite naturally to
the safe haven of the status quo. In the housing context, color-blindness
lends support to the quantity and quality of housing that exists or would
exist without redistributional schemes like integration maintenance. In
most instances, that means that color-blindness supports less decent
housing for minorities. In the name of blindness to race and distribution,
color-blindness implicitly promotes a housing situation that has a great
impact on race and distribution.
B. Pro-Integration
1. Contrasts. The pro-integration principle stands in sharp con-
trast to color-blindness principle. Color-blindness adheres to neutrality;
the government should not promote its version of the public good. In
contrast, the pro-integration position promotes the public good of
integration.
Likewise, the pro-integration principle clashes with the anti-discrim-
ination principle. Integration maintenance quota schemes serve primar-
220. Newman's study rated Starrett City superior with respect to crime, schools, and physical
conditions to four nearby, overwhelmingly minority developments. Memorandum of Starrett City
Tenants' Association, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc (No. 87-6132) at 10-15 (citing Oscar Newman AfT.) [hereinafter
Tenants Association Memorandum]. As a result of the Arthur settlement, 18 other housing projects
were identified with fewer than 20% minority occupancy. Id. at 6.
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ily to promote integration in housing, not to eradicate discrimination in
housing.2 2 1 These quotas discriminate against minorities by placing a
cap on minority access. This differentiates them from quotas used in the
employment or education contexts, which provide for rather than limit,
minority accesS. 2 2 2
The distinction between prohibiting segregation and requiring inte-
gration begins to blur in the case of school desegregation. To maintain
the distinction one would have to hold that Green v. County School
Board223 and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education224 er-
roneously interpreted Brown v. Board of Education.225  Forbidding
school segregation appears an idle gesture without subsequent attempts
to integrate the schools.
Similarly, in housing, the anti-discrimination and pro-integration
principles move toward a closer symbiotic relationship. Attempting to
drive a wedge between the two principles overlooks a distinction between
the short and long term effects of an integration maintenance policy. In
the short term, integration maintenance does limit some minority access,
but, in the long term, the policy's goal includes the eradication of dis-
crimination in housing. The dwindling resource of adequate housing for
minorities has discriminatory effects. Access to over eighty, predomi-
nantly white, housing projects in New York City is effectively denied to
minorities through de facto segregation,226 and many of the comparable
minority housing projects do not provide the benefits of Starrett City.227
Starrett City represents a point between these two types of housing
projects. Starrett City gives minorities greater access to housing develop-
ments than the almost exclusively white housing developments, and Star-
rett City provides better housing conditions for some minorities than
most exclusively minority developments. So, Starrett City's pro-integra-
tion position appears compatible with, rather than in stark opposition to,
221. See Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas, supra note 7, at 203.
222. Id
223. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating a plan wherein students
freely chose their school).
224. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (allowing a quota-type
remedy to achieve school desegregation).
225. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Cf., Note, The Legality of Integration Mainte-
nance Quotas, supra note 7, at 225. The author asserts that Green and Swann were wrongly decided:
"quotas in the education context do not raise the individual rights problem involved when a govern-
ment agency controls the allocation of housing, a limited good, on the basis of race since all children
have access to public education." Id (citation omitted).
226. See Hellman, supra note 84, at 56.
227. See infra text accompanying notes 234-43.
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the anti-discrimination principle. This compatibility does not justify pro-
integration, but it does undermine the courts' attempts to drive a wedge
between the two principles. Before turning to a justification for pro-inte-
gration, a few brief remarks might prove helpful.
Pro-integration invokes a straight-forward analysis: separation be-
tween the races leads to prejudice. Integration can overcome the fears
and suspicions that exist between the races. Society needs to go beyond
its concern for discrimination against the individual so that it can pro-
mote integrated communities, thereby ending the mistrust between the
two groups.228
2. Intrinsic Good. The virtues of integration may seem obvious.
Its value is long recognized in the law; injury to a person's right to live in
an integrated society is cognizable under Title VIII.229
In addition, the idea of exclusion runs counter to a vision of a
human community. Integration appears intertwined with the promotion
of the ideals of equality and respect for others.230
Yet, integration does not necessarily forge any links to equality and
respect. For example, the Boston busing controversy illustrates how the
early stages of integration can engender inequality and disrespect.231 Al-
ternatively, perhaps the long term consequences of integration can serve
to justify it.
Few would deny that integration has some value; however, integra-
tion does not function as an intrinsic good. An intrinsic good, compared
to an instrumental good, has value in itself and not because of or in rela-
tionship to some other value.232 At best, integration may stand as a
means to the fulfillment of other values such as equality and respect.
Because integration's value is dependent on its relationship to other val-
ues, Starrett City mistakenly portrayed integration as an intrinsic good.
228. See Kifner, Ruling Threatens Starrett City's Dream, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1988, at Bl,
col.2; Rosenberg, Starrett City's Sound Racial Policy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1988, at C3, col.1.
229. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the standing
of white occupants in an action against an apartment complex for refusing to rent to minorities);
Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); and Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363 (1982) (fair housing organizations and "testers" who receive false information may sue housing
providers for violations of the Fair Housing Act).
230. Judge Newman's dissenting pro-integration position has been bitterly attacked: "Even an
equalitarian-minded judge can inadvertently achieve racist consequences by basing a facially non-
racist argument, which sacrifices racial equality for some other end, on tipping point reasoning."
Current Issues, supra note 44, at 31.
231. See generally J. LuKAs, supra note 4.
232. See Olson, The Good, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 367 (1967).
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To conceive of the problem with integration as an intrinsic good in
another manner, consider the following questions. What intrinsic value
flows from integration? Do humans become more fulfilled by virtue of
their participation in integrated communities? Can humans become
equally fulfilled under non-integration conditions? Does integration have
any negative implications? Given the difficulty of constructing uncon-
tested answers and despite the initial lure, integration does not sit in a
higher privileged position relative to other public goods. Perhaps a con-
sequential analysis can place integration on firmer footing.
3. Consequences. Although some undesirable consequences may
flow from integration, the benefits of integration seem to far outweigh the
costs. The proponents of Starrett City can point to many beneficial re-
sults of its integration maintenance policy. An appreciation of Starrett
City's success, in part, evolves from knowing the circumstances under
which Starrett grew. The following is how the developers saw these
circumstances:
The bordering area of East New York was predominantly black, plagued by
crime and vandalism, and rife with abandoned buildings. A large junkyard
was across the street to the north, and a foul-smelling garbage dump lay to
the south. A water pollution control plant was on the east, and the devel-
opment was separated from Canarsie to the west by an unbridged and fre-
quently stagnant creek. In addition, the development lay in the flight path
of planes approaching and departing Kennedy Airport... [Tihe only avail-
able public transportation was slow and costly, requiring two fares and a
subway ride through high-crime areas.2 33
Starrett City arose in an area that did not lend itself to success for a
housing project. Yet Starrett City "is one of the most successful exam-
ples in the nation of racial integration in housing, ' 23 4 as well as being
"perhaps the most integrated area of" New York City.23 Crime rates
remain markedly lower in Starrett City than the surrounding areas. Ac-
cording to a 1985 Pennsylvania State University study, Starrett City
qualified as one of the safest places to live in the United States, despite its
location in the 75th Precinct, which had one of the New York City's
highest crime rates.236 Oscar Newman conducted a study of Starrett
233. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 9, Starrett City (citing, Rosenberg Aft.).
234. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1103 (Newman,J., dissenting). See also
Prial, Starrett City: 20,000 Tenants, Few Complaints, N.Y. Times Dec. 10, 1984, at BI, col.1 (noting
that "[d]isgruntled tenants are as scarce as Starrett City has potholes in its well kept streets.").
235. Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas, supra note 7, at 232 n.149.
236. See Hellman, supra note 84, at 56.
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City and four nearby housing projects that had tipped in the 1970s.23
He found that Starrett City's crime rate fell appreciably below those of
the other four projects.23
Moreover, Starrett City's integrated schools ranked among the top-
performing schools in New York City.239 In the complex itself, Starrett
City's managers maintained racial balance not only in each building but
also on each floor.24 Starrett City contains "a shopping center, eight
garages, its own power plant, a clubhouse, gymnasiums, saunas, squash
and tennis courts, recreation rooms, two indoor swimming pools, a nurs-
ery and two schools."' It can further boast of 46 civic associations, its
own cable television station, and a private armed police force, complete
with German shepherds.242 The educational level of nonwhites at Star-
rett City kept even with that of white tenants, while nonwhites had
higher median earnings than whites.2 43 Forty percent of the white ten-
ants and twenty-six percent of the nonwhite tenants received rent subsi-
dies.2' Minority tenants resided at Starrett City longer than whites.24 5
The beneficial consequences of Starrett City's integration mainte-
nance policy appears to be holding steady, but the court's decision and
the resulting demographic changes may undermine the gains. In 1988
the waiting list numbered 18,000, whereas in 1985 it held at 6,000.246 As
of August 20, 1990 Starrett City had 59% of its units occupied by whites
and 41% by minorities. In 1989, 250 whites, 57 African-Americans, 21
Hispanics, and 29 Asians vacated their units. Currently, there is a wait-
ing list of 6,482 and "[o]f the people undergoing approval for apart-
ments, more than 90% are minority."247
Overall, the benefits of integration may seem too obvious to bear
repeating. Integration promotes equality, increases minority achieve-
ment, diminishes prejudice, and broadens horizons. Yet, the initially ob-
237. Tenants Association Memorandum, supra note 220, at 10 (citing Oscar Newman Aff.).
238. Id. (citing Oscar Newman Aff.)
239. See Hellman, supra note 84, at 55.
240. Id.
241. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, Starrett City.
242. Kifner, Ruling Threatens Starrett City's Dream, N.Y. Times Nov. 14, 1988, at B1, col. 2.
243. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. at 675 (citing study by Dr. Kenneth
Clark).
244. Id. The Court of Appeals found this heavy subsidization of white tenants further evi-
denced Starrett City's disregard for the Act. Id. at 678. An alternative interpretation is that it
demonstrates the lengths to which developers will go to create a stable integrated housing project.
245. Id at 675.
246. Finder, Starrett City Will Stop Using Quotas to Foster Integration, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8,
1988, at B4, col. 1.
247. Telephone interview, supra note 162.
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vious benefits do not readily withstand a closer examination. Farrell
challenges the purported benefits of integration in the context of school
integration.248 He asks whether integration actually promotes equality.
In integrated schools, blacks may suffer disproportionately.249 Further-
more, Farrell contends that blacks may do worse at integrated schools
than at segregated ones.25° Integration may actually increase prejudice
by instilling racist attitudes that may not have been present before the
implementation of integration.25'
Similar charges do not hold against Starrett City's integration pol-
icy. Overall, minority occupants at Starrett City only indicate their satis-
faction with conditions at Starrett City.252 Conditions at Starrett City
schools, for example, appear exemplary and nonminorities attest to the
positive effects of living in Starrett City on racial issues.253 So, it seems
integration yields some definite benefits, at least, in the case of Starrett
City.
4. The Pragmatic White Shield. The benefits derived from Starrett
City's pro-integration policy, at least in part, flow from the infrastruc-
tural support the development receives as a result of the presence of
whites. For example, the benefits from Starrett City's integrated school
partially stem from the white and oriental students at Starrett City rais-
ing the average level of performance.254 Thus, the justification for a pro-
integration position comes down to adopting a strong, pragmatic, and far
from palatable claim; the white students in Starrett's schools serve, in
effect and in part, as a shield for the black students. Professor Kaplan
employed the powerful and disturbing metaphor of a white shield:
248. See Farrell, supra note 170, at 553.
249. Counter to Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), separate is not inherently unequal
even in the school context: "[i]ntegrated education is hardly equal when inherent racism causes
disproportionate number of disciplinary actions and expulsions against black students in integrated
schools."- Id at 589.
250. Farrell asserts that "there is substantial evidence that integrated schools provide little, if
any, educational benefit to black children, and that they can, in fact, promote stress." Id. at 590.
(citation omitted).
251. See id. at 591. Farrell contends "[i]ntegration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condi-
tion to diminish prejudice." Id. at 592.
252. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
253. Id
254. According to the Starrett City Tenants' Association Amici Curiae Brief, "[t]he consistent
and substantial differences in achievement [among black students at Starrett City and black students
at Public School 306] reflected above show that it is not just white and oriental students at Starrett
City who are raising the average performance level...." Brief for the Starrett City Tenants' Associ-
ation, et. al., as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 13-14.
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[T]he biased community can more easily discriminate against Negroes who
are all concentrated in one area. At least until very recently, Negro areas
traditionally received far less adequate governmental services-mainte-
nance, police protection, etc.-than did the rest of the city. Integration
thus protects the Negro by surrounding him with a shield of whites whom
the community, presumably, is less willing to short-change.2"' (citation
omitted).
Integration thus acts as a white shield, providing blacks with access
to resources routinely made available to whites; it does not constitute an
intrinsic good. There is nothing per se valuable about blacks living next
to whites. Living in an all black community could be just as rewarding
and beneficial as living in an all white community. However, except for
some instances, placing blacks in exclusively minority housing areas con-
demns them to unfavorable living conditions.
Unfortunately, Starrett City works not because of the integration,
but because an integrated development (and not a development with only
racial minorities) can still command sufficient resources to survive. Tip-
ping would be irrelevant if resources necessary to maintain and improve
the infrastructure, schools, etc., could be guaranteed for an all members
of racial minorities at Starrett City.2" 6 But the chances of adequate infra-
structure support remain rather slim, since the white shield protects a
certain level of resource support. When whites flee, they take resources
with them. Within the context of the social restraints under which Star-
rett City must operate, its integration maintenance policy can be only
pragmatically justified; it is a means of insuring infrastructural support,
not a means for promoting equality of opportunity and treatment.
V. REDISTRIBUTION AND ANTI-SUBJUGATION
A. Context
The anti-discrimination, color-blind, and pro-integration principles
all fail to directly confront social reality. Color-blindness chooses to re-
main blind to the structural and temporally persistent features of racism.
The anti-discrimination principle ignores the contextual complexities and
results of race-conscious remedies such as Starrett City's integration
maintenance. Pro-integration builds walls, literally and figuratively, to
keep out the more sinister aspects of the surrounding social reality.
255. See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal Worl" Equality for the Negro-The Problem of
Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966).
256. See Newman, supra note 161, at 195-96 (finding an inverse correlation between black occu-
pancy and political support for public housing).
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B. Redistribution
The debate over the three principles masks a more fundamental is-
sue than contextual insensitivity. Each principle contains a largely hid-
den redistributional implication. Color-blindness makes little or no
room for any redistribution of public goods. Adherents of color-blind-
ness accept the current distribution patterns whatever the nature of the
public good-employment, education, or housing. In accepting some
forms of affirmative action, the anti-discrimination principle allows some
degree of redistribution. Integration, by going beyond the affirmative ac-
tion programs found acceptable within the anti-discrimination position,
promotes the greatest degree of redistribution of the three competing
principles.
Interestingly, the debate over these principles is seldom cast in terms
of the redistribution issue. Instead, the choice between these competing
principles is formulated in terms of abstract criteria, such as promotion
of equal treatment, thereby not confronting the truly difficult questions
of redistribution.
The importance of these redistributional implications is exemplified
by an analysis of the term "fair" in "fair housing," contained in the Fair
Housing Act.257 In general, "fair" has two types of meanings: formal
and substantive. In the formal sense, "fair" refers to the nature of the
procedures. Accordingly, the procedures should avoid bias so that ev-
eryone has an equal opportunity to obtain housing. The formal interpre-
tation is weakened by the fact that fair procedures can yield highly unjust
results. If minorities have a fair opportunity to rent housing but the
available stock of housing and economic conditions for renting limit the
rentals to only highly inferior housing, then the fair procedures are
ineffective.
In contrast to the formal interpretation of "fair housing," the sub-
stantive sense places a definite value on the public good. Substantively,
"fair housing" means decent, comparable, and good housing. The sub-
stantive interpretation does not entail a guarantee of a certain dwelling,
but it does devise a measure that compares the housing situations of
groups, not of individuals. The substantive interpretation looks at vari-
ous social groups and the disparity between the group's enjoyment of the
public good. If wide disparity between groups persists in the fulfillment
of the public good, then in the substantive sense, this disparity is unfair.
If inadequate housing or lack of housing disproportionately burdens a
257. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 39
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
certain group, particularly an already disadvantaged group, such as
blacks, substantive unfairness exists.
Notice that a substantive interpretation of "fairness" has shifted the
terms of the debate. The principles of color-blindness and anti-discrimi-
nation focus on the treatment of individuals; the substantive interpreta-
tion redirects the focus to the treatment of groups. The integration
principle leans heavily toward a group analysis; however, the integration
principle's solution to a group's redistributional issues remains constant:
integration.
The integration principle works only in light of certain contextual
factors. Contextual sensitivity constitutes both its strength and its weak-
ness. The contextual factors make Starrett City's integration mainte-
nance plan understandable and, within certain limits, defensible. In the
context of the social realities confronting a housing development such as
Starrett City, it had little choice other than to adopt an integration main-
tenance policy. In the next section, this Article will address these con-
textual conditions in light of a different principle, anti-subjugation.
C. The Anti-Subjugation Principle
The anti-subjugation principle is compatible with a substantive in-
terpretation of fairness and provides a powerful means for assessing the
contextual conditions. Subjugation involves the unfair distributional pat-
terns of public goods to disadvantaged groups.2"' This formulation of
the anti-subjugation principle condemns distributional patterns which
adversely affect disadvantaged groups and explicitly addresses the prob-
lem of distribution.2"9
Individuals become subjugated, in part, due to their group member-
ship.2"0 Because of institutional structures and other factors, some
258. See Young, Displacing the Distributive Paradigm, in JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIp-
FERENCE (1990) for a survey of various distributive justice definitions.
259. Other recent formulations have not incorporated an explicit reference to redistribution.
For example, Lawrence Tribe, in his analysis of the Equal Protection clause, characterizes the anti-
subjugation principle as one "which aims to break down legally created or legally reinforced systems
of subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1515 (2d ed. 1988). Anti-subjugation (or, what Ruth Colker calls, anti-subordination),
holds that "it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to have subordinated status because of
their lack of power in society as a whole." Colker, Anti-Discrimination Above Alk Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986). If subordination includes the unfair pattern
of the distribution of decent housing to African-Americans, then Tribe and Colker are in agreement
with the formulation in the text.
260. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 158 (1990)
(discussing what groups should constitutionally qualify as disadvantaged, Le., as suspect classes).
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groups obtain fewer resources than others and receive a disproportionate
share of public goods. Racism constitutes one of the most pernicious
forms of subjugation. The anti-subjugation principle attacks racism at its
structural roots and not at the symptomatic level of individual treatment.
It exposes the institutional structures responsible for the unfair distribu-
tion of resources such as housing.
The anti-subjugation principle261 sheds new light on tipping. Previ-
ously, this Article argued for the legitimacy of the tipping phenomenon
on the grounds that white flight could not be solely attributed to discrim-
inatory attitudes.2 "2 Other factors, such as the threat of urban blight,
contribute to white flight. However, accepting the reality of urban blight
and its connection with concentrations of racial minorities does not
thereby purge the tipping issue of racism. The connection between urban
blight and racial concentration only holds given racist structures leading
to that connection. Tipping may not correlate directly with racist atti-
tudes, but it relies on racist structures. Whites, not blacks, generally
have the means to engage in flight from urban blight. That fact holds
irrespective of white attitudes.
Why should blacks have to grovel for the shield of integration in
order to get decent housing? Starrett City's success constitutes society's
failure. Again, Kaplan forcefully captures the essence of this concern:
"[i]n common speech the benign quota is an upper limit on something
desirable-we do not speak of benign quotas of the number of Negroes in
slums but rather of the number in desirable housing." '263
What of a ceiling on blacks in ghettoes? That would be a ceiling
perfectly in keeping with the anti-subjugation principle. Ceilings, such as
those used in integration maintenance programs, place a limit on a desir-
able item, a public good. The anti-subjugation principle highlights the
irony that minorities, in many cases, can achieve access to public goods
only by having their access limited.
The anti-subjugation principle sheds light on the other principles, as
well. In the case of color-blindness, an anti-subjugation perspective helps
explain the historical ambiguities of the color-blindness principle. De-
pending on the context, color-blindness can have subjugating or liberat-
ing affects. When representing the school children in Brown,2"
261. For development of the anti-subjugation or anti-subordination principle in the context of
constitutional law, see Colker, supra note 259.
262. See text accompanying notes 162-70.
263. See Kaplan, supra note 255.
264. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 484 (1954).
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Thurgood Marshall argued against the separate but equal principle of
Plessy265 and in favor of color-blindness. He argued for color-blindness
to be put into the service of redistributing educational benefits to Ne-
groes.266 Today, color-blindness ideals can act as an obstacle to redis-
tributional programs. For example, the Supreme Court, in the name of
color-blindness, ruled against the redistributional set-aside program in
Croson.267 Justice Marshall issued a vehement dissent268 that repre-
sented his adoption of the anti-subjugation principle.2 69
The anti-subjugation principle pushes the anti-discrimination princi-
ple to a deeper level. An anti-discrimination analysis focuses on the con-
sequences of the programs, not the contextual details. Because
integration maintenance programs limit minority access, they thereby
qualify for condemnation by the anti-discrimination principle. In con-
trast, the anti-subjugation principle focuses more on context. Applying
an anti-subjugation approach to the anti-discrimination principle results
in an emphasis on the subjugating affects of integration maintenance on
minorities as a group rather than on how the treatment affects
individuals.
Finally, adoption of the anti-subjugation moves the pro-integration
position toward a more consequential direction. The pro-integration
principle, as exemplified by Starrett City's approach, relies on a weakly
supported premise that integration constitutes an intrinsic good. The in-
tegration principle therefore supports integrated housing projects even in
the hypothetical case where segregated minority housing proves far supe-
rior to the integrated variety. Because the anti-subjugation principle
looks to the benefits accorded to minorities by the different schemes and
not to the schemes themselves, it encourages adherents of the pro-inte-
gration position to more honestly appraise the benefits of integration.
In sum, the anti-subjugation principle can result in redistributional
and thus more defensible versions of the principles examined in this Arti-
cle. Each principle is highly malleable. Despite their abstract formula-
tions, they remain deeply dependent upon particular contextual factors.
Only the anti-subjugation principle explicitly evaluates the contextual
factors themselves.
Contextually, Starrett City's policy is justified only in a limited sense
265. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
266. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
267. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
268. Id at 538 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
269. See Recent Developments, supra note 11, at 573 n.59.
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under the anti-subjugation principle. Starrett City's policy does not sub-
jugate racial minorities given current housing conditions. However,
those conditions do subjugate racial minorities because it appears that
minorities can only obtain decent housing through integration mainte-
nance policies. Yet Starrett City's policy counters the subjugation of
blacks by providing relatively stable housing otherwise less available. It
is unfortunate that a case can be made for the need of minority ceilings
such as the one used by Starrett City in today's world.
The courts, by themselves, cannot change social conditions in a way
that assures that there will be no more need for integration maintenance
programs. Legislators, along with "we the people," need to take the
challenges issued by the anti-subjugation principle very seriously. The
courts can, however, provide coherence to vague pieces of legislation
such as the Fair Housing Act by reconciling its apparent conflicts be-
tween the principles of anti-discrimination color-blindness, and pro-inte-
gration in favor of the more fundamental and more justifiable principle of
anti-subjugation. Whatever else lies behind the Act, the Act surely was
meant to dissipate the forces of subjugation.
CONCLUSION
Housing, "the last major frontier in civil rights,""27 receives scant
litigation attention when compared to other civil rights issues such as
education or employment.271 For example, after the momentous 1954
Brown v. Board of Education72 decision, education became the first and
foremost focus of civil rights litigation.273 The passage of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,274 added the area of employment to the civil
rights agenda. However, despite the passage of the Fair Housing Act of
1968 (Act),75 housing has lagged behind education and employment,
particularly in terms of implementing the legislation.
270. Note, The Legality of Race-Conscious Access Quotas Under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 9
CARmOzo L. REv. 1053, (1988) (quoting R. ScHWmMM, HousiNo DISCRIMINATION LAW 3 (Supp.
1986) (quoting Lamb, Equal Housing Opportunity in IMPLEMENTING OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLIcY 148
(C. Bullock & C. Lamb eds., 1984)).
271. See Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas, supra note 7 at 198.
272. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
273. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Although activists some-
times assume that schools are the logical place to begin the battle against racism, perhaps the
amount the litigation directed at schools, as well as the litigation obstacles presented by the composi-
tion of schools make housing a better target.
274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1988).
275. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
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Yet housing occupies a pivotal position vis-a-vis education and em-
ployment.276 Residential segregation can quickly undo highly intrusive
educational desegregation plans. Furthermore, the seemingly intractable
nature of segregation in housing can offset gains in countering discrimi-
nation in education and employment.27 7 Any attempt to eliminate dis-
crimination will fall short unless it makes concerted efforts to counter
housing discrimination. Where and how people live does a great deal to
help define who they are.
There is an old adage to the effect that if you study a leaf long
enough and thoroughly enough, you will understand the world. This
Article does not unravel the mysteries of the world, or even the mysteries
of housing and race in this country. However, a detailed look at the
microcosm can provide some insights into the social world at large. Star-
rett City's policy poses a paradox: how can an ennobling experiment in
integration demean by discriminating at the same time? Starrett City, in
some sense, represents the conflicts of certain segments of white society
in dealing with racism. On the one hand, whites want to "do something"
about racism. While on the other hand, whites refuse to confront the
deep structures of racism, preferring to deal with racism within carefully
constructed walls, rather than providing the infrastructure support sys-
tems needed to attain and retain decent and affordable housing for mi-
norities. Unless we explicitly confront the forces of subjugation and
work directly to improve the lot of the disadvantaged, the contradictory
strain of Starrett City will continue to disturb us.
Morley concludes his analysis of Starrett City with the observation
that "if Starrett City proves anything, it proves that we can do worse
than to start building on a garbage dump.""27 But can't we do better
than to build fragile structures on the garbage heaps of racism?
276. See Hankins, The Constitutional Implications of Residential Segregation and School Segre-
gation-To Boldly Go Where Few Courts Have Gone, 30 How. L.J. 773 (1987).
277. During the floor debates on the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Senator Mondale stated:
The barriers of housing discrimination stifle hope and achievement, and promote rage
and despair; they tell the Negro citizen trapped in an urban slum there is no escape, that
even were he able to get a decent education and a good job, he would still not have the
freedom other Americans enjoy to choose where he and his family will live.
114 CONG. REc. 2, 274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
278. Double Reverse Discrimination, supra note 1, at 18.
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